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Aid and Donor Partnerships' in Ghana's Education Sector, 1987-2007:

A Critical Review of the Literature and Progress

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(December 15, 2007)

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Abbreviations

AESOP(s)	Annual Education Sector Operational Plan(s)
AfDB	African Development Bank
BADEA	Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa
APM	Annual Partnership Meeting
BECE	Basic Education Certificate Examination
BESIP	Basic Education Sector Improvement Programme
BUNGO(s)	Business-NGO(s)
CAS	Country Assistance Strategy
CBO(s)	Community-Based Organisation(s)
CG	Consultative Group
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
COTVET	Council for Technical and Vocational Education and Training
CRT	Criteria Reference Testing
CSO(s)	Civil Society Organisation(s)
CSSP	Community Secondary School Construction
DAC	Development Assistance Committee of the OECD
DACF	District Assemblies Common Fund
DEO	District Education Office, Ghana Education Service
DFID	Department for International Development
DP(s)	Development Partner(s)
EC	European Community
EdSAC	Education Sector Adjustment Credit
EdSeP	Education Sector Project
EFA	Education for All
EMIS	Education Management Information System
EQUALL	Education Quality for All Project
ERP	Educational Reform Programme
ESAF	Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility
ESAR	Education Sector Annual Review
ESP	Education Strategic Plan
ESSP	Education Sector Support Project
ESTAC	Education Sector Technical Advisory Committee
EU	European Union
EU MPP	EU micro-projects programme
FBO(s)	Faith-Based Organisation(s)
FCUBE	Free Compulsory Universal Basic Education
FTI	Fast Track Initiative
GDC	German Development Cooperation
GER	Gross Enrolment Ratio
GES	Ghana Education Service
GETFund	Ghana Education Trust Fund
GoG	Government of Ghana
GoJ	Government of Japan
GPI	Gender Parity Index

GPRS I	Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy
GPRS II	Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy
GPS	Ghana Partnership Strategy
GRATIS	Ghana Regional Appropriate Technology Industrial Service
GTZ	German Technical Cooperation
HERP	Health and Education Rehabilitation Project
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative
HRD	Human Resources Development
HR	Human Resources
ICCES	Integrated Community Centres for Employable Skills
ICT	Information Communications Technology
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISA(s)	Informal Sector Association(s)
ISODEC	Integrated Social Development Centre
ISP	Infrastructure and Service Provision
JHS	Junior High School
JICA	Japanese International Corporation
JOCV	Japanese Overseas Cooperation Volunteers
JSS	Junior Secondary School
JSS 3	Final year of JSS (year 3)
KfW	<i>Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau</i> (German Development Bank)
KG	Kindergarten
MCA	Millennium Challenge Account
MDBS	Multi-Donor Budget Support
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MoE	Ministry of Education (now MoESS)
MoES	Ministry of Education and Sports (now MoESS)
MoESS	Ministry of Education, Science and Sports
MoEYS	Ministry of Education Youth and Sports (now MoESS)
MoMYE	Ministry of Manpower, Youth and Employment
NACVET	National Coordinating Committee on Technical and Vocational Education and Training
NBSSI	National Board for Small-Scale Industries
NER	Net Enrolment Ratio
NGO(s)	Non-Governmental Organisation(s)
<i>NNED</i>	<i>Northern Network for Education and Development</i>
NVTI	National Vocational Training Institute
ODA	Overseas Development Agency (now DFID)
OECD	Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
P6	Final year of primary school (year 6)
PBME	Planning, Budgeting, Monitoring and Evaluation
PFPs	Policy Framework Papers
PNDC	Provisional National Defence Council
PMT	Performance Monitoring Tests

PMU	Project Management Unit
PONGO(s)	Political-NGO(s)
PRBS	Poverty Reduction Budget Support
PREP	Primary Education Programme
PRGF	Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
PSD	Primary School Development Project
QUANGO(s)	Quasi-NGO(s)
QUIPS	Quality Improvements in Primary Schools
REP	Rural Enterprise Project
RNE	Royal Netherlands Embassy
SAF	Structural Adjustment Facilities
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programme(s)
SESP	Support to Education Strategic Plan
SHS	Senior High School
SMC(s)	School Management Committee(s)
SSCE	Senior Secondary Certificate Examination
SSS	Senior Secondary School
SSS 3	Final year of SSS (year 3)
STEP	Skills Training and Entrepreneurship Programme
SWAp	Sector Wide Approach
TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training
UK	United Kingdom
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UPE	Universal Primary Education
USAID	United States Agency for Development
VOTEC	Vocational and Technical Education Centre
VSO	Voluntary Service Overseas (UK)
VSP	Vocational Skills and Informal Sector support project
VTI(s)	Vocational Technical Institute(s)
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Programme
WSD	Whole School Development

Executive Summary

This literature review provides the reader with some insights into the historic relationships of donor partnerships within Ghana's basic education and skills development sub-sectors. The review looks at the evolution of these partnerships over the years and the various mechanisms and types of development assistance; for example, project and programme aid, the Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) of the 1990s/2000s, and Multi-Donor Budget Support (MDBS), since 2003.

An estimated 20 multilateral and bilateral donors have been involved in Ghana's education sector since the reforms began in 1987. This involvement has ranged from direct allocation of resources to the provision of technical services in the form of policy interventions and the supply of consultancy services, and of late, direct budgetary support. The principal development partners (DPs) have included the World Bank (the Bank), European Union, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), the U.K.'s Department for International Development (DFID) and, United States' Agency for International Development (USAID). Others are the African Development Bank (AfDB), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF).

Donor aid, particularly since 1989, has taken the form of infrastructure provision, including classrooms and books, because over the period the Government of Ghana (GoG) has been devoting an average of 90.0% of its education sector expenditures to salaries, administration, and services, leaving little for investments. Between 1989 and 2001, World Bank aid to the non-wage education sector ranged between 4.5% and 69.4% of government expenditure and averaged 33% per year over the period. Similarly, bilateral support to the non-wage education sector ranged between 6.5% and 155.3%, averaging 41% per year (World Bank: 2004a: 61).

Overall, however, donor resources to the education sector have been characterised by wide swings, as shown in Table 1. The share of donor money going to primary education, for example, increased from 68.8% in 2003 to 72.7% in 2005 at the same time that the share for JSS fell precipitously from 20.2% in 2003 to about 7.0% in 2005. In absolute terms, allocations going to teacher education increased from US\$64,196 in 2003 to US\$2.6 million in 2005. By contrast, the steep increase in donor resources for technical and vocational training (TVET), from US\$64,196 in 2003 to US\$1.4 million in 2004 tapered off to US\$599,809 in 2005. The adverse effects of such erratic flows in donor resources on recipient countries' ability to manage both reforms and development have been well documented (Njeru, 2003; Rajan, *et al.*, 2005; GoG, 2003).

The extent of donor contributions to the country's education sector has also raised questions about national ownership of education policies. The GoG and its DPs, principally the World Bank, are known to have had disagreements over various aspects of the reforms. For example, the Bank opposed the vocationalisation of the curriculum,²

² Since the mid-1980s diversified education had lost favour in the World Bank due partly to Bank studies by Psacharopoulos and Loxley (1986) and partly to the rate of return studies that showed that primary

contrary to the wishes of the Ghanaian government (Palmer, 2005c). Indeed, the vocationalisation element of the JSS was very much a government desire that could not be curbed by donors.

In most instances, however, the flow of donor funds to education was dependent on Ghana fulfilling certain conditions set forth by the World Bank and IMF, sometimes for themselves but mostly on behalf of donors. The nature of the conditions varied from donor to donor but some conditions are referred to as ‘performance criteria’, and the others are called ‘structural benchmarks’ and ‘prior conditions’. Some of the conditionalities restrain the government from making social spending and maintaining certain macroeconomic and fiscal targets. Non-observance of some conditionalities resulted in the withholding of disbursements of the aid by donors until compliance or a waiver was granted. Even then, the loan or grant was released in tranches, with particular conditionalities attached to each tranche (Alexander, 1998).

Regardless of the huge support from donors, education outcomes fell below expectation. There is mounting evidence that despite the large amounts of domestic and foreign resources that Ghana’s education sector received from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, there were few quality improvements in the sector (Thompson and Casely-Hayford, 2007).

In terms of partnerships, the literature review found that the closeness of the relationship between DPs and the GoG on the one hand, and amongst DPs on the other, has fluctuated since the mid-1980s. It was reasonably good during the mid-1980s to early 1990s as DPs were able to align support to the 1987 education reform, following the lead of the World Bank. During the mid-1990s to 2002 partnerships amongst DPs deteriorated and hence DP partnership with the GoG, while generally aligned to fCUBE, was uncoordinated. 2003 signalled the start of a better partnership with the GoG’s GPRS I and ESP documents providing a clear strategy that DPs could get behind, and closer partnership arrangements like the MDBS emerging.

This partnership, however, is not without its own problems, ranging from lack of coordination in key programme areas to the reluctance of some donors to participate in some aid programmes in which they do not have a dominant voice or position. The review has also shown that despite substantial increases in donor resources for education reforms, outcomes in the sector remain much lower than expected. The review also suggests a widening resource gap and inequity in financing between different sub sectors, populations and regions of the country. Both the rich and the poor, male and female, suffer from falling education outcomes in education. However, the impact of donor partnerships on the sector remains under researched along with the impact of falling educational standards on various groupings within the education sector.

education had the highest private returns.

1. Introduction

Partnership is defined in many ways in the literature. According to Amoako (2005), it is an understanding between different actors expressing reciprocal rights and obligations aimed at a clear goal of mutual benefit. Amoako (2005) notes that ‘partnership is a two-way process grounded in shared liberties, duties and trust, as well as a relationship rooted in an agreement that mirrors shared objectives through a mutually agreed division of labour’.

It is estimated that over 20 multilateral and bilateral donors have been involved in Ghana’s education sector. This involvement has ranged from direct allocation of resources to the provision of technical services in the form of policy interventions and the supply of consultancy services, and of late, direct budgetary support. The principal Development Partners (DPs) include the World Bank (the Bank), European Union, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), the U.K.’s Department for International Development (DFID) and, United States’ Agency for International Development (USAID). Others are the African Development Bank (AfDB), the World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF).

Many DPs have increased their support since the Kufuor government came to power in 2001. This support is increasingly taking the form of programme aid and sector support. This is notably the case for Dutch and British aid, which is 90% distributed in the form of budgetary programme or sector-based support particularly in the healthcare and education ministries (French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006). In 2007, the main DPs supporting the basic education and skills development sub-sectors were the World Bank, DFID, USAID, JICA and AfDB – though there are many others making substantial contributions, such as the German Development Agency (GTZ) along with several other civil society organisations.

Traditionally, donor contributions to Ghana have come through grants and loans, project aid, commodity aid, technical assistance, programme aid, debt relief and budget support. Tangible evidence of the patterns, trends, and the amounts of specific technical assistance or commodity aid are hard to come by, since donor contributions in this form could be part of a wider package of project or programme aid, grants or loans. They could also be separate or tied to specific sectors such as education, health, water and sanitation, energy or for specific people or geographical area. In all these arrangements, donors normally choose their preferred areas or sectors and provide aid on the basis of agreed arrangements (Tuffour, 2005). Where development assistance is provided in the form of direct budget support it is difficult to talk of certain amounts being allocated by the sub-sector. Partnership arrangements or mechanisms for aid delivery have also changed over time (*ibid.*).

The following literature review aims to provide the reader with some insight into the historic relationships of donor partnerships within Ghana’s basic education and skills development sub-sectors. The review looks at the evolution of these partnerships over the

years and the various mechanisms and types of development assistance; for example project and programme aid, the Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) of the 1990s/2000s, and Multi-Donor Budget Support (MDBS), since 2003.

The objectives of this literature review are:

- to identify and describe what the different partnership arrangements between the government and donor-agencies are (and have been since the 1987 education reforms); and,
- to the extent that the existing literature will allow, analyse how and to what extent these partnership arrangements affect(ed) basic education and skills development outcomes in Ghana.

The first part of the review provides an overview of the financing of Ghana's education sector since the 1980s.³

The main part of this review will examine the evolution of partnerships within Ghana's basic education sector and the analysis is divided into three periods:

- 1987 education reforms to the mid-1990s: this period was characterised by reasonable coordination among DPs, most of whom aligned their development assistance with the World Bank led support to the Government of Ghana (GoG) education reform process.
- Mid-1990s to 2002: as the World Bank was joined in Ghana by other large development partners (e.g. UK and USA) coordination of DP support to the GoG Free Compulsory Universal Basic Education (fCUBE) policy, launched in 1996, became more fragmented as donor competition increased.
- 2003 to 2007: the GoG's 2003-2015 Education Strategic Plan (ESP), launched in 2003, has led to an improvement of DP coordination and enhanced GoG-DP partnership; this is seen, for example, in new aid modalities like a SWAp and the multi-donor budgetary support (MDBS) mechanism. Another important development in this period is the 2004 White Paper on the education reform⁴ and its relationship with the 2003 ESP.

Annex 1 of this report summarises GoG initiatives and external agency support from the early 1960s onwards with regard to basic education.⁵

³ A separate paper by RECOUP deals with the financing of Ghana's education sector (Thompson and Casely-Hayford, 2007)

⁴ The reform is due to commence in the 2007-08 academic year.

⁵ Annex 2 provides a similar summary with regard to skills development. Similar summary tables could be produced for other sub-sectors of education; for example upper secondary or tertiary education. Since the focus of this review is basic education and skills development these tables are not included here.

While the focus of this review is on partnerships in education, this review includes a discussion of partnerships within Ghana's skills development sector. It outlines the main DP's projects and programmes within this sector and comments on the extent to which these arrangements impacted on Ghana's skills development system. In particular, annex 2 of this review summarises GoG initiatives and external agency support from the late 1950s/ early 1960s onwards with regard to skills development.

The review concludes that the relationship between donors and GoG over the period of reforms has been uneven in qualitative terms, with donors alternating between common funding mechanisms and separate ones. Overall, the impact of aid on the education sector appears to be negligible, at best particularly given the large level of donor inflows from the 1980's onwards which amount to over 3 billion US (Thompson and Casely-Hayford, 2007).

2. Overview of the financing of Ghana's education sector: 1980s-2000s

The financing of the education sector in Ghana has changed since 1980, both donor and central government financing of education has increased since 1980 (*see table 1*). Prior to the economic reforms in 1984, the educational sector suffered massive financing constraints which led to a serious shortage of teachers (i.e. brain drain of teachers due to economic hardship) and teaching materials. For instance, between 1976 and 1983, government's education-sector budget, as a share of GDP, declined from 6.4% to 1.4%. (World Bank, 2004:7). As a result, the educational system deteriorated precipitating the 1987 educational reform. However, the gains from the economic reforms and the 1987 educational reform led to massive inflow of both donor and government resource to the educational sector. Since then, donor and government financing of education has increased (Thompson and Casely-Hayford, 2007).

According to Thompson and Casely-Hayford, 2007, 'the need for additional resources for the sector has caused the government to explore other sources of financing in more recent years'. These include the District Assembly Common Fund (DACF) and the Ghana Education Trust Fund (GETFund). DACF came into being with the 1992 Constitution and is financed from a constitutionally mandated 5.0% of central government revenue that is to be disbursed to district assemblies to supplement their development expenditures. The law establishing the Fund recommends that 20.0% of the allocation (implying 1.0% of total central government revenue) be invested in educational infrastructure, particularly for basic education, at the local level. The GETFund law was passed in 2000 and the Fund was to be financed from 20.0% of revenue from the Value Added Tax. For instance, 'of the US\$1.0 billion that was spent on the education sector in 2006, about 30.0% (US\$307 million) came from non-donor and non-GoG sources, such as the GETFund, District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF) and internally generated funds (IGF)' (Thompson and Casely-Hayford, 2007).

Table 1: Sources of education financing since 1999

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
In millions of US dollars (at 2006 prices)								
GoG	350.5	342.0	385.2	472.3	525.6	541.6	586.7	706.3
Donor	34.0	18.7	27.3	39.4	28.6	58.1	74.8	24.5
IGF	-	-	-	-	-	73.0	83.4	111.4
GETFund	-	-	-	-	62.3	75.8	86.5	125.5
HIPC	-	-	-	-	17.6	37.9	37.8	48.5
DACF	-	-	-	-	7.0	14.5	10.4	15.1
EFA Catalytic	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.2	3.0
SIF	-	-	-	-	-	-	5.7	3.7
Total	384.6	360.7	412.5	511.7	641.2	800.9	889.5	1,038.1
GoG-Donor Total	384.6	360.7	412.5	511.7	554.3	599.7	661.5	730.8

Source: GES Annual Education Sector Review Report, various issues. Dollar conversion by AFC.

A 2004 World Bank review of support to basic education in Ghana states that the ‘donor community has a massive presence in Ghana’ and that their support is ‘substantial’ (World Bank, 2004c: 7-8). For example, since 1989 over 90% of government expenditure was spent on salaries, administration and service, leaving little for investments (i.e. books and buildings).⁶ It is therefore not surprising that DPs have played a large role in financing the non-wage part of the education sector spending, particularly capital investments. Between 1989 and 2001, World Bank aid to the non-wage education sector ranged between 4.5% and 69.4% of government expenditure and averaged 33% per year over the period. Similarly, bilateral support to the non-wage education sector ranged between 6.5% and 155.3%, averaging 41% per year (World Bank: 2004a: 61).

In contrast to the government’s more sector-wide view of education (as laid out in the 2004 White Paper), development partners, particularly USAID and DFID, have tended to target financing programmes at the basic education level instead of other sub-sectors. However, some DPs programmes supported post-basic levels in the 1990s and continue to do so in the 2000s.

For example, in the 1990s the World Bank financed the Community Secondary School Construction (CSSP) project (1991-95) and the Tertiary Education Project (1992-98). In the 2000s, the main DPs supporting the post-basic level have been the AfDB (support to Senior Secondary Schools/ SSS for the upgrading of schools to model SSS standard); the World Bank (Education Sector Project, which has three components; in support of capacity building in the main Ministry and Ghana Education Service, in support of implementation of the Education Strategic Plan as it relates to basic education, and in support of tertiary education); and the Spanish Grant Facility (for the procurement of computers and other equipment for the polytechnics and the University of Development Studies).

Overall, however, donor resources to the education sector have been characterised by wide swings, although the absolute amounts for primary education have remained

⁶ The amount of the total education budget spent on personal emoluments increased from 86.5% in 2003 to 88.1% in 2004 (GoG, 2004c: 98). Foster and Zormelo (2002: 18) note that education costs are always dominated by teachers’ salaries, but Ghana is an ‘extreme’ case.

relatively stable between US\$25.0 million and US\$28.5 million (see Table 2) Allocations to teacher education increased from US\$64,196 in 2003 to US\$2.6 million in 2005, while by contrast, the steep increase in donor resources for technical and vocational training (TVET), from US\$64,196 in 2003 to US\$1.4 million in 2004 tapered off to US\$599,809 in 2005. The adverse effects of such erratic flows in donor resources on recipient countries' ability to manage both reforms and development generally have been well documented (Njeru, 2003; Rajan, *et al.*, 2005; GoG, 2003).

Table 2: Donor financing of education by sector (in constant US\$ and % shares)

	2003		2004		2005		2006	
	Level	% Share	Level	% Share	Level	% Share	Level	% Share
Pre-school	0.44	1.1	0.40	0.8	0.35	0.6	3.97	5.3
Primary School	26.65	68.8	25.11	51.5	28.46	49.0	27.88	37.0
Junior Secondary School	7.84	20.2	14.03	28.8	10.36	17.8	10.32	13.7
Senior Secondary School	-	-	-	-	0.91	1.6	17.70	23.5
TVET	0.09	0.2	-	-	0.69	1.2	0.57	0.8
SPED	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
NFED	3.61	9.3	-	-	0.15	0.3	0.63	0.8
Teacher Education	0.09	0.2	-	-	1.00	1.7	2.82	3.8
Tertiary	-	-	9.21	18.9	16.06	27.6	9.52	12.6
Management and Supervision	-	-	-	-	0.15	0.3	-	-
HIV-AIDS	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.87	2.5
Total	38.72	100.0	48.74	100.0	58.11	100.0	75.27	100.0
Basic-education sector only								
	2003		2004		2005		2006	
	Level	% Share	Level	% Share	Level	% Share	Level	% Share
Pre-school	0.44	1.27	0.40	1.02	0.35	0.91	3.97	9.43
Primary School	26.65	76.30	25.11	63.50	28.46	72.65	27.88	66.11
Junior Secondary School	7.84	22.43	14.03	35.48	10.36	26.45	10.32	24.47
Total	34.93	100.00	39.54	100.00	39.17	100.00	42.17	100.00
<i>Source: Ghana Education Service</i>								

2.1. Aid, conditionality, partnership and outcomes

Aid partnership agreements typically set out terms and conditions to be met by the parties. Agreements often allow donors to stop funding if there is a significant breakdown in the performance of public financial management and accountability. This is sometimes known as 'fiduciary conditionality'. They can also allow donors to stop funding if a country veers significantly from its poverty reduction objectives or international obligations. There is general agreement that conditionality in these areas is important, though there is debate about the particular circumstances in which it is appropriate, given the potentially adverse consequences on poor people of any reduction or interruption of aid (Alexander, 1998).

Aid partnership has often been conditional on economic, environmental or social policies, such as macroeconomic stabilisation or increased investment in health or education. Sometimes it has been conditional on specific policies such as privatisation, which have

been controversial in the partner country. If the country failed to implement agreed commitments then donors have reduced or even stopped their support (Alexander, 1998).

Despite the observed shortcomings, donors have broadened the focus of aid conditions from macroeconomic policies to include political and institutional change, as well as social and environmental policy, such as commitment by the partner country to tackle corruption or establish more transparent and inclusive systems of government. Additionally, donors now include conditions about the process of policy-making, such as the consultation of the poor and other stakeholders in the preparation of policy documents like the GPRS. These ‘process conditions’, however, do not consider the content of the policies at stake.

The evidence on the impact of policy conditionality in bringing about policy change is at best mixed. In early 2000, when Ghana conducted Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (PSIA) across five key development areas, there has been insufficient analysis of the impact of different reforms on poor people (GoG, 2005a). In the case of Ghana, Azeem and Ayamdoo (2005) found that the processes involved in conducting the PSIAs were not participatory, and many people at the grassroots level were not involved in the study.

The 2005 DFID policy paper on aid conditionality, *Partnerships for poverty reduction: rethinking conditionality* (DFID, 2005b), states the importance of countries pursuing their own path to achieving the MDGs: ‘We [DFID] believe that developing countries must be able to determine their own policies for meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)’ (DFID, 2005b: 1).

Given this encouragement, the GoG could well argue that they have decided not to interpret the MDGs in the narrow sense – and focus too heavily on primary education – but that they recognise that more investment in post-basic education and training are essential for the MDGs to be useful beyond the mere production of people with basic-school education (Akoojee and McGrath, 2005; Hayman, 2005; King, 2005; Palmer, 2005b; Palmer, 2005c; Palmer et al., 2007; Tilak, 2005; Wedgwood, 2005).

While policy conditionality does have some adverse impacts, part of the problem of donor intervention in the education sector has been the question of capacity. There is strong evidence to suggest weak absorption of resources and inability to utilise resources allocated to the sector.⁷ The low level of implementation capacity by the MOESS itself has led some DPs to continue to contract their own national agencies to implement the programmes being executed in the country (e.g. USAID); the question of sustainability of the interventions is very relevant. More planning within MOESS/GES is needed to implement modalities and plan for appropriate and realistic educational goals within the Ghanaian context. This would ensure that capacity for implementation and programming is available from within the GoG to carryout programmes.

⁷ Based on reports from donor meetings and interviews, Casely-Hayford 2000).

3. Developments in Ghana's education sector since 1970s

3.1. Crisis in education: 1970s to 1980s

Ghana's economic crisis of the early 1980s (see, for example, Canagarajah and Mazumdar, 1997) was paralleled by a crisis in education and training. Government financing for education declined sharply from 6.4% to 1.4% of GDP between 1976-1983, resulting in the decline of standards and quality in education (World Bank, 1996). By the early 1980s, the education system in Ghana was facing severe administrative, performance and resource problems (Buchert, 2002; Sawyerr, 1997: 4; Yeboah, 1990). These included lack of trained teachers; lack of materials; books and teaching aids; inadequate infrastructure; poor pay for teachers; high drop-out rates; low enrolment rates; poor educational management and administration; and a general lack of financing for education. The disruptions to the educational strategy of Ghana – caused by repeated coups, the economic crisis and long spells of strikes by teachers and students – led to the decline in both public spending on education and academic quality. By 1983, approximately 50% of trained primary teachers had left the country (Ahadzie, 2000: 20) due to the deteriorating economic climate and working conditions in Ghana.⁸ Untrained teachers were employed by the government in a bid to avoid a complete disintegration of the education system (Konadu, 1994: 41). This objective, however, was attained at the expense of the quality of education as 'pupil' teachers were obviously ill-equipped to teach at levels comparable to those of their trained counterparts. By 1983 the quality of education had reached crisis levels and 'it became necessary for a serious attempt to be made to salvage it.'⁹

3.2 Educational Reform Programme of 1987

In 1987, with World Bank support, an Educational Reform Programme (ERP) was started with the objective of improving educational quality. The ERP placed renewed emphasis on vocationalising the basic education system in an attempt to re-orientate the educational system to better prepare youth for the world of work (Hutchful, 2002; Palmer, 2007a). The ERP resulted in the educational system changing from the 6-4-5-2 -3/4 version to 6-3-3-3/4 (six years of primary, three years of JSS, three years of senior secondary and three or four years of tertiary). This shortened the average length of pre-tertiary education from 17 to 12 years (World Bank, 2004a: 9).¹⁰ The 1987 reforms also led to comprehensive curriculum reforms. 'Whereas the Middle School was a grammar school, in the JSS pre-technical and pre-vocational education became universally part of the curriculum' (Donge, 2002: 14).

The political environment leading up to the 1987 education reform contributed both to its design and to the underlying assumptions of how the reform would impact on the

⁸ The Commission for Africa report (2005) discusses the impact brain drain is having on development in Africa today.

⁹ <http://www.ghana.edu.gh/past/postIndependence.html> accessed on 12.05.04.

¹⁰ Six years primary, four years middle school, five years secondary school and two years sixth-form (6-4-5-2). However, students who managed to pass the common entrance examination without completing middle school were able to complete their pre-tertiary education in a shorter period.

economy (Palmer, 2007a). At the time of the reform, the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), a military government driven by socialist ideology that had come to power through a coup in December 1981, had made it their objective to make the education system more equitable and responsive to the socio-economic needs of the country, particularly to reduce the high unemployment among the youth. Hence, the PNDC was keen to vocationalise the lower secondary level in the belief that this would make it more orientated towards the world of work (*ibid*). Moreover, the increased attention in the 1987 reform to basic education had a political basis: The PNDC was seeking political support from rural areas – not from the minority though vocal urban elite. The government felt that the reforms would provide the medium for gaining such support (Donge, 2002).

The World Bank was ‘particularly influential among the development partners’ in the lead up to, and in support of, the 1987 education reform (Buchert, 2002: 73). The Bank supported Ghana’s education sector with two sector adjustment credits (budgetary support), Education Sector Adjustment Credit (EdSAC) I (1986-91) and EdSAC II (1990-94), as well as the education component of the Health and Education Rehabilitation Project (HERP) (1986-91). EdSAC I and II were directly concerned with the education reforms initiated in 1987 and were largely concentrated on basic education. About two-thirds of support under the two EdSACs was spent on hardware, such as buildings, equipment, furniture, and vehicles (World Bank, 2004a).¹¹ Procurement was carried out by a newly established Project Management Unit (PMU) located in the MoE.

EdSAC I and II were negotiated in the context of the structural adjustment policies of the Ghanaian government, with support from the Fund and the Bank. EdSAC I was co-financed by several donors and had features of a SWAp, a decade before the term was used (World Bank, 2004a; 2004d). According to Buchert (2002), a SWAp is understood in the Ghanaian context as follows:

[O]ne that would further holistic development of the national education system and integrate contributions from all development partners within a policy framework developed by the national government. It was understood as an aid modality that could be contrasted with project assistance, the latter generally being understood as piecemeal, ad hoc assistance, often contributed outside of national priorities. (p. 75)

The ERP was such a clearly defined, government-owned sector strategy (World Bank, 2004a: 27). Furthermore, the understanding of a SWAp for some in Ghana necessitates support for the education sector budget, rather than for specific projects or programmes. This implies ‘that a common pool or basket of money would be made available by the agencies to the national government or Ministry of Education to implement a national programme according to prior agreement with the agencies’ (Buchert, 2002: 75). Hence, it can be said that the World Bank support to education through EdSaC I and II (1986-94)

¹¹ Educational ‘hardware’ contrasts to ‘software’, which includes, for example, in-service training for teachers, and encouraging new teaching methods.

and the budget-support component of USAID's Primary Education Project (PREP) (1990-95) – see below - were equivalent to SWAp for education.

Donor cooperation in the co-financing of the ERP was largely encouraged by the World Bank and other DPs (e.g. UK's Overseas Development Administration - now DFID, UNICEF, AfDB, Norway, Switzerland, GTZ and USAID in 1990) that were willing to follow the Bank's lead. This DP coordination 'continued in the early 1990s' and was 'helped by the fact that the PMU for EdSAC, which received technical assistance from the Bank, assumed responsibility for the management of all external projects' (World Bank, 2004a: 27).

World Bank critics often assert that the Bank indiscriminately imposes reform on unwilling recipients. For example, Heyneman (2003: 315) argues that 'local policy makers have become passive recipients of the Bank's agendas'. The World Bank, however, counters that the 1987 education reforms were characterized by 'strong domestic ownership' (World Bank, 2004a: 25).¹² The GoG and its DPs, principally the World Bank, are known to have had disagreements over various aspects of the reforms. For example, the Bank opposed the vocationalisation of the curriculum,¹³ contrary to the wishes of the Ghanaian government (Palmer, 2005c). Indeed, the vocationalisation element of the JSS was very much a government desire that could not be curbed by donors. The ERP drew heavily on the Ghanaian 1972 Dzobo Educational Reform Committee – for example the vocationalised JSS element. In the end, the Bank 'accepted this [vocationalisation] policy in order to retain its position supporting the education sector, [with its] staff saying that they saw no alternative at the time in view of the strong position taken by the senior MoE [Ministry of Education] official' (World Bank, 2004a: 25).

Harry Sawyerr, the Ghanaian Minister of Education 1993-1997, acknowledges the role of international donor support in helping to turn around Ghana's education system, but with the GoG firmly in charge of policy, direction and donor coordination (Sawyerr, 1997). Nonetheless, on certain aspects of the ERP, the Bank in particular was able to exert pressure on the government with the leverage of EdSAC I and II (Buchert, 2002). For example, while the Bank reluctantly accepted the government's vocationalisation policy, it persuaded the government 'to restrict vocational training at JSS level to an introduction to tools' (World Bank, 2004a: 27).

A second example of Bank influence on the shape of education reform programme was evidenced by the Bank persuading the government *not* to expand secondary schools too quickly, but to concentrate instead on basic education. 'The government wished to expand senior secondary education more rapidly than the Bank thought wise' (World Bank, 2004a: 25). A senior World Bank evaluation officer commented that Rawlings, the then Head of State of Ghana, wanted to get the donors to agree on a 50% secondary

¹² See World Bank (2004a: 25-26) for a discussion of this.

¹³ Since the mid-1980s diversified education had lost favour in the World Bank due partly to Bank studies by Psacharopoulos and Loxley (1986) and partly to the rate of return studies that showed that primary education had the highest private returns.

school enrolment ratio target, but reluctantly agreed to lower the target after pressure from donors who saw 30% as a more realistic target.¹⁴

Indeed, conditionalities attached to the EdSAC II included the requirement that the Ghana government keep its recurrent basic education budget at 62%. While this target was met, another conditionality attached to both the EdSACs – that there should be agreement on the education budget – was not always achieved. For example, in 1990 government overspending on tertiary and vocational education led to tensions between government and the Bank (World Bank: 2004a: 20, 188).

The partnership among DPs and between DPs and the government was based on all parties trying to cooperate with each other in the face of, sometimes, conflicting views on the best way to support Ghana's education sector. An example of the, sometimes, conflicting views among DPs can be seen in the World Bank support to tertiary education in the 1990s. In contrast with other DPs, the World Bank wanted to support activities outside of basic education and higher education was an area which the Bank was keen to support in the 1990s to the tune of US\$44.8 million; see, for example, the World Bank Tertiary Education Project (1992-98). In this regard, the World Bank was seen as 'a traitor to EFA' by other DPs in Ghana (e.g. DFID and USAID).¹⁵

3.3. Impact of partnership on educational outcomes of the 1987 education reforms

From the 1980s, the flow of donor funds to education was dependent on Ghana fulfilling certain conditions set by the World Bank and IMF, sometimes for themselves but mostly on behalf of donors. The nature of the conditions varied from donor to donor but some conditions are referred to as 'performance criteria', and the others are called 'structural benchmarks' and 'prior conditions'. Some of the conditionalities restrain the government from making social spending and maintaining certain macroeconomic and fiscal targets. Non-observance of some conditionalities resulted in the withholding of disbursements of aid by donors until compliance or a waiver was granted. Even then, the loan or grant was released in tranches, with particular conditionalities attached to each tranche (Alexander, 1998).

Apart from the fact that there were often delays in release of funds for the sector, some conditionalities had serious consequences for the education sector. Pupil teachers were retrenched and for a very long time those vacancies were not filled, with many classrooms going without teachers (Abugre and Ayine, 1999). Cuts in social spending; cash and carry and cost sharing in education conditionalities were harmful to families and led to chronic under-investment in education, resulting in reduced enrolment, poor quality outcomes, and lack of access (*Ibid*). For instance, before the intervention of the IMF in Ghana in 1983, at the basic level of the educational ladder, there were no fees for tuition, textbooks, learning and teaching aids, stationery and furniture. School fees were subsequently introduced as part of the WB/IMF policy of cost-recovery and cost-sharing,

¹⁴ Palmer interview with senior evaluation officer in the Operations Evaluation Department of the World Bank (16th June, 2004, Washington).

¹⁵ Palmer interview with senior evaluation officer in the Operations Evaluation Department of the World Bank (16th June, 2004, Washington).

which was introduced into the country following the education reforms of the period (Abugre and Ayine, 1999).

Regardless of the huge support from donors, education outcomes fell below expectation. There is mounting evidence that despite the large amounts of domestic and foreign resources that Ghana's education sector received from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, there were few quality improvements in the sector (Thompson and Casely-Hayford, 2007). This lack of improvement was noted by British Foreign Secretary, who has been reported as saying that 'advances have not been uniform and poverty remains pervasive. We have gone forward and backward over the past 50 years' (Ratcliffe and Macrae, 1999: 4).

The reduction in social spending (a condition of the SAPs) meant cutting down education, health, water and sanitation. Cost sharing and other conditionalities kept the poor people away from school. Logically, those who attribute the poor education outcomes to donor conditionalities may have been right. Several studies show that many poor households could not afford to send their kids to school, and in the process dropped girls from school in preference for boys (Kuyole E., C. Ayamdoo and A. Mba, 2001).

The conditionalities attached to donor support to education in the 1980s undermined the effectiveness of donor aid to education in Ghana. The 1987 education sector reforms with the conditionalities perpetuated a partial and/or progressive diminution of the role of the state in the provision of basic education and other social services, which contributed to a fall in enrolments and low completion rates (Ayamdoo and Ayine, 2002).

4. Partnerships and outcomes in Ghana's education sector: FCUBE, MDGs and FTI

4.1. FCUBE: Failure of donor co-ordination and SWAp

At the start of the 1990s, following the Education for All (EFA) Conference, donor support to the Ghanaian education sector largely focused on basic education. USAID, for example, initiated a US\$35 million Primary Education Project (PREP) spanning 1990 to 1995, while the World Bank implemented the Primary School Development Project (PSD) (1993-98). In addition, the Bank funded the Literacy and Functional Skills Project (1991-95) and National Functional Literacy Project (1992-98).

The 1992 constitution reiterated an earlier policy on education, as spelt out in the Education Act of 1961, by introducing Free Compulsory Basic Education (fCUBE), which was launched in September 1995 (GoG, 1995b). The policy for the basic education sub-sector was outlined in a 1996 fCUBE strategy document (GoG, 1996a) which stated the government's commitment 'to making schooling from Basic Stage 1 through 9 free and compulsory for all school-going-age children by the year 2005... [and] to improving the quality of the education services offered' (GoG, 1996a: 1). FCUBE concentrated on improving three major areas: teaching and learning; management; and access and participation.

According to Buchert (2004: 73), the strategy and action plans of fCUBE were prepared in ‘active cooperation’ with DPs. The fCUBE also provided a basis for a coordinated sub-sector programme through a framework for donor support to basic education (World Bank, 2004d: 2). The World Bank’s supported fCUBE through a Basic Education Sector Improvement Programme (BESIP) (1996-02, US\$ 47.9 million) (World Bank, 1996), that was meant to help improve the quality of school infrastructure and foster changes in school management to enhance learning outcomes (World Bank, 2004d: ix). The Bank intended BESIP to be part of a multi-donor support programme to fCUBE (World Bank, 2004d: ix):

Hence as BESIP was originally designed it was close to a SWAp (World Bank, 2003b). However, ‘donor support did not materialize in this form’ (World Bank, 2004d: 2). Instead ‘the other major donors (the U.S. and U.K.) did not join the programme but financed their own basic education activities’ (World Bank, 2004d: ix). The result was that the GoG ‘had three large donors (World Bank, U.S., and U.K.) with remarkably similar projects [BESIP, QUIPS and ESSP, respectively] under different management systems with an increase in transaction costs for government’ (World Bank, 2004d: 11). As a result of DPs adopting separate project structures (albeit aligned to fCUBE), the original BESIP ‘design and financing plan had to be restructured and the BESIP became a traditional stand-alone investment project after the mid-term review’ (World Bank, 2003b: 4). In addition to the World Bank’s BESIP, the Government ran DFID’s Education Sector Support Project (ESSP) (1998-2005) (UK £50 million) and USAID’s Quality Improvements in Primary Schools (QUIPS) (1997-04) project (US \$53 million (USAID, 2003)).¹⁶

DFID’s ESSP provided flexible budget support for the GoG’s Whole School Development Programme (WSD) and, as such, focused on district and school level interventions.¹⁷ The USAID supported QUIPS programme was designed to demonstrate the conditions required for effective and sustainable primary education in model “partnership schools” across Ghana. The QUIPS model dealt simultaneously with policy reform and with school and community development, emphasizing the following objectives: (1) improving the quality of teaching and learning; (2) building capacity for decentralized school management; (3) increasing community involvement in schools; and (4) improving the physical learning environment. Project assistance in the amount of US\$51.8 million provided extensive technical assistance and training for teaching staff and community members in 367 school communities (three in each of 110 districts) (QUIPS Programme Evaluation Team, 2005).

Having three large DPs (World Bank, DFID and USAID) with three similar projects (BESIP, ESSP and QUIPS) undoubtedly led to some negative educational outcomes; for example it was already noted above that transaction costs for the GoG were increased and

¹⁶ The QUIPS project selected a number of primary schools in each district for support in a broad range of fields: school management, improvement of teaching quality, and material support for teaching materials, and infrastructure (Donge, 2002: 17).

¹⁷ WSD was the GoG strategy to achieve fCUBE.

all three projects required ‘the attention of the same limited capacity of MoE’ (World Bank, 2003b: 41). Another outcome of this approach was the limited capacity of districts to manage and sustain three large educational projects at the same time. The QUIPS impact study found limited sustained change at the district and school level after five years of project completion (QUIPS Programme Evaluation, 2005). The QUIPS evaluation also found that there was a negative feeling among district officers involved in QUIPS since they viewed the project as having added work onto their main program of work and sometimes derailing their work plans at district level.

Ratcliffe and Macrae (1999: 5) found that projects funded by development agencies ‘undermine Government leadership, contribute to policy fragmentation, duplicate approaches, distort spending priorities and insufficiently address institutional development and sustainability issues’. The added workload these projects demand at the district and national level (i.e., competing time requirements for workshops and poor collective planning) has caused some officers to report ‘donor fatigue’ and disillusionment with the number of interventions at the district level.

The mid-term review for USAID’s QUIPS stated that, ‘donor co-ordination under the fCUBE has been characterized as fragmented and lacks collective consultation on strategic plans and financing... [B]etween donors, there has been little regular sharing or coordination of the key elements of their programmes’ and ‘the lack of coordination of donor activities at the district level is negatively affecting DEOs [District Education Offices] operations and attitudes’ (Bonner, Bonner, du Plessis, Hartwell and Marshall, 2001: 11, 48). The interaction of DFID’s ESSP with USAID’s QUIPS can be seen in Box 1.

Box 1. The interaction of QUIPS (USAID) and Whole School Development (DFID)

QUIPS implementation (1997) began a year before the DFID-funded Whole School Development Programme (WSD) got underway throughout Ghana (1998). The WSD programme (funded through DFID’s Education Sector Support Project) operated in ways that created a competition for attention of key GES staff, who were critical to ensuring the sustainability of QUIPS school reforms. The impact of the parallel implementation of the WSD programme on QUIPS implementation is difficult to measure in quantitative terms, but from an implementation point of view, it should not be ignored. A few ways in which the WSD programme impacted QUIPS are illustrated below:

- i) Circuit supervisors and other District Education Office (DEO) staff were frequently assigned to carry out WSD funded work which prevented them from participating in QUIPS supported activities at the district/school level. For example, when the QUIPS master teacher trainers came to a district for school-based training and expected that circuit supervisors and DEO staff would participate as co-trainers, such individuals were often working on WSD programmes.
- ii) Financial incentives provided through WSD (e.g. per diem to attend workshops, special data collection initiatives, etc) made it more attractive to attend to WSD work than QUIPS work and other general responsibilities.

iii) Initially, there was some confusion at the district to school level as to how to harmonize the resources and school-based training approaches provided by both programmes. (This issue was addressed and largely worked out about halfway through the life of the project when the key stakeholders formalized a process for harmonizing approaches and materials developed by QUIPS and WSD).

Source: QUIPS Programme Evaluation Team, 2005: 9

During the same period, the 2003 Evaluation of ESSP (1998–2003) noted the following:

Considerable support is provided to the education sector. However... there has been extremely poor donor co-ordination. With few donors committed to support a sector wide approach, the typical project approach is cost inefficient and leads to duplication of efforts and systems. (GoG/DFID, 2003: section 4.9)

The fledgling structure for an education sector programme (SWAp)¹⁸ ‘appears to have foundered on donor competition’ (World Bank, 2004a: 28). The Bank comments that the spark that set in motion donor fragmentation in the education sector came from the Overseas Development Administration (ODA), now DFID, in 1996:

The crucial episode appears to have been a workshop in London (supported by UK ODA) to develop a sector strategy... despite the fact that a strategy already existed and that no other donors were invited to the meeting. From this time onward first DFID and then USAID went their own way with programmes to finance basic education. (World Bank, 2004d: 11-12)

Indeed, from the late 1990s until 2003 - when the GoG introduced its Education Strategic Plan (ESP, 2003-2015) - the main donors like DFID and USAID ‘largely went their own way with programmes to finance basic education’ (World Bank, 2004a: 26). Buchert (2002) comments that during the 1990s ‘partnerships... deteriorated’ (p. 78) rather than grew.

The way fCUBE developed in practice (its design as a GoG-led national strategy whose initial design encompassed coordinated DP support, followed by its implementation which was anything but coordinated in practice) has contributed to a confusion with regard to what exactly the SWAp is in relation to Ghana’s education sector. Sibbons and Seel (2000:8) commented that ‘there is no clear answer to the question ‘what is the SWAp’. Despite the fact that DP support to fCUBE was uncoordinated, they did at least design their individual projects and programmes to support the priority areas of fCUBE (Buchert, 2002), which suggests a degree of coherence. To the extent that SWAps are concerned with DPs aligning support to national agendas, this occurred with DPs and fCUBE in the mid-1990s. However, Buchert (2002: 81) goes on to comment that:

There seemed to be common agreement that the agencies fully supported the framework for the government FCUBE programme, although... the framework

¹⁸ There had been a donor coordination group for the education sector set up in 1994 and there was a government strategy (fCUBE); both of which are pre-conditions for an education sector programme.

was so generally defined that any agency could pursue its own objectives and still be seen to work within the framework.

In spite of the lack of coordination of DP support, the World Bank's BESIP, DFID's ESSP and USAID's QUIPS all had some positive impact on educational outcomes. For example, by government agreement DFID's ESSP was targeted at the primary sub-sector 'where it made a large impact... the establishment of SMCs [School Management Committees] and introduction of School Performance Improvement Plans under the Whole-School Development (WSD) programme were irreversible positive innovations' (DFID, 2005a: 11). Although USAID's QUIPS led to some improvements in educational outcomes, it also yielded some unexpected consequences (*Box 2*).

Box 2. QUIPS: Improved educational outcomes, but some unexpected consequences

QUIPS led to some improvements in educational outcomes, but also some unexpected consequences. These included the following:

i) Strengthening the role of School Management Committees/ Parent Teacher Associations in primary education was the broadest QUIPS intervention, and because communities are far more stable than teachers or district personnel, the impact is more likely to last. QUIPS also strengthened the internal leadership structures in communities and encouraged communities to contribute and plan towards school improvement. The community focused interventions had a positive correlation with high performing schools and enhanced learning outcomes.

ii) Building national awareness about the responsibilities of communities to support schooling was one of the major accomplishments of QUIPS.

iii) While there was no direct evidence that QUIPS-financed infrastructure improvements were tied to school performance and pupil learning, QUIPS infrastructure was successful in increasing communities' sense of ownership of their schools by involving them in the construction process.

iv) By the second year of the QUIPS intervention, pupils in QUIPS schools were able to read with meaning more than control schools.

v) Another outcome of the QUIPS programme was increased enrolments, particularly for girls. Although increased enrolments are generally viewed as favourable, the 2005 final evaluation of QUIPS suggested that they present systemic problems for Ghana. Reportedly, because QUIPS partnership schools quickly developed a reputation for being "good" schools, parents in surrounding communities began transferring their children out of nearby schools and into QUIPS schools. This produced an imbalance in enrolment distribution in communities adjacent to QUIPS schools. Enrolment in surrounding schools was depleted.

In many QUIPS schools, the evaluation found that enrolment gains were not sustained, because the basic conditions that existed during QUIPS, especially staffing and supervision at the district level were not maintained.

Source: QUIPS Programme Evaluation Team, 2005: xiv-xv, xvii, 2, 63

Examples of where donor partnerships with Government have not supported the education sector are widespread but nowhere are they more visible than in the area of literacy assessment, where the donor community has had significant influence in developing, sustaining and disrupting assessment approaches used to test child literacy (*Box 3*).

Box 3. Aid and Learning outcomes in the 1990s: The case of literacy assessment

Over the last fifteen years, there have been two main approaches to assessing literacy attainment among children at primary and basic education levels. These are the Criterion Reference Test (CRT) and the Performance Monitoring Tests (PMT). The CRT was designed and funded by USAID between 1992 and 2000, while the Performance Monitoring Tests (PMT) was a more indigenous approach developed by MOE experts to testing children at various points in the primary education system and was fully adopted by MOESS in the late 1990's. When funds for these programmes stopped in 2005 due to internal and external tensions over the methods of assessment and the promise of a more integrated system of assessment; both assessment systems were no longer continued and the procedures for rigorous assessment was weakened.

‘The failure of the primary schools to provide even minimum levels of learning and literacy to the majority of pupils represents a crisis in Ghana’s implementation of its educational reform. The greatest challenge for Ghana’s Basic Education policy is to reform school management and teaching to ensure that children do, in fact, learn. In Ghana’s case, therefore, the quality of education is even more important at this point than the quantity. Further expansion of the system to take increasing numbers of children can only be justified if the system itself is reformed to ensure that enrolled children actually learn’ (UNICEF, 1994: 27).

Casely-Hayford (2000) reported that the CRT results had resonating effects within the donor and government circles during the mid to last 1990's. Many of the external agencies working towards educational improvement were disappointed with the CRT results, along with the Government. The 1995 CRT results provoked alarm as only 3.6% of pupils in P6 were achieving mastery in English and 5% in Maths. Strategic planning meetings between donor agencies became more intense and a flurry of criticisms was launched against the Government during the quarterly donor-government consultations (Casely-Hayford, 2000). But despite the heavy influx of donor funds and concentrated attention to systemic reform, there was only slight improvement in CRT results between 1995 and 1998. Official comments from the MoE are straightforward in reporting the problems:

‘The need for a Ministry-led sector analysis arose from the concerns about the implementation, effectiveness and financing of the education reform initiated in 1987. The reform has been successful in putting a new structure of education in place and increasing financing and inputs including infrastructure, instructional material and teacher training. However, evidence from national assessments indicate that by the end of primary school the great majority of pupils are not functionally literate or numerate. It is now evident that while these inputs are necessary for the reform, they have not been sufficient to improving the learning outcomes of pupils’ (MoE, 1995).

The MoE recognised that the main problem was the behaviour of teachers and lack of learning taking place inside the schools. They, however, did not agree on the causes of these factors. A basic education sector review involving a study to assess the main problems and identify the

key areas of focus for design and planning purposes was initiated by the MOE in the mid 1990's. Each donor decided to focus on a different aspect of the sector review and contracted external and internal consultants. USAID conducted research on issues of teaching and learning; DFID conducted research into finance and teacher education; the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) commissioned research on girls' education, and the World Bank conducted studies on management and efficiency (World Bank, 1996; GES/UNICEF, 1995; Kraft, 1994; Kraft, 1995). Most of the studies were national in scope, leaving little time to consider the nature of the problems within the context of education at district and local level.

The role of donor intervention in the assessment system of the Ghana Education Service is a good example of how donor funding can influence and sometimes derail systems which are gradually developing from within the country and ensuring that the capacity for sustainability is secured.

The World Bank BESIP also had some positive impact on educational outcomes. The development objective of BESIP was to improve the teaching process and learning outcomes; strengthen management of the basic education system; improve access to basic education; and ensure financial sustainability. Given the many interventions by other development partners in the same objectives as above and over the same period, the degree of achievements that could be attributed to BESIP is difficult to determine. Overall, steady improvements were made in quality. CRT scores showed improvements in both English and Mathematics over the period of the project, both in mean scores and in the percentage of pupils attaining masterly levels. Access and participation also improved, as measured by output indicators such as GER, Primary School Intake Ratio, and Share of Girl's Enrolment. No discernible improvements were established for resource use efficiency (World Bank, 2003b: 21).

A 2004 evaluation of World Bank support to basic education in Ghana (1988-2003), *Books, Buildings, and Learning Outcomes: An Impact Evaluation of World Bank Support to Basic Education in Ghana*, outlines the impact of Bank support (which has mainly been in the form of hardware such as books and buildings – as opposed to software) (Box 4).

Box 4. World Bank support to basic education in Ghana (1988-2003): Inputs to outputs, and outputs to outcomes

A 2004 evaluation of World Bank support to basic education in Ghana (1988-2003) outlines both the finance and policy support that the Bank has provided to the education sector over this 15 year evaluation period. Despite the clear government ownership of the 1987 education reform programme, the Bank can be argued to have played an important role in its implementation. While critics argue that the reforms were carried out too quickly, it is at least as plausible that delays would have resulted in failure. The Bank's policy conditions underpinned the 1987 education reforms as its finance helped them be realized, assisted by technical support.

The Bank evaluation shows that during this 15 year period there were substantial gains in educational outputs. For example, enrolments in basic education have increased by over 10% compared to 15 years ago, and today less than one in twenty primary school graduates are illiterate, compared to nearly two-thirds 15 years ago.

Statistical analysis shows that these improvements in learning outcomes are clearly and strongly linked to better welfare as measured by higher income, better nutrition, and reduced mortality.

The data shows that gains in educational outputs are directly linked to better school quality, manifested in improved infrastructure and greater availability of school supplies.

Statistical analysis shows that increased school quality can in turn be linked to the Bank's support which has financed the construction of 8,000 classroom blocks and provided 35 million textbooks under various projects (HERP, EdSAC I & II, PSD, BESIP) over the last 15 years. Nationally, the Bank supported school building and rehabilitation programmes has increased enrolments by around four percent. Moreover Bank support helped sustain initially unpopular reforms, demonstrating the efficacy of working in partnership with a government committed to a well-defined sectoral strategy.

Source: World Bank, 2004a: ix-xi, 25, 29

Despite the positive outcomes of the evaluative work carried out by the World Banks own evaluation division, other donor agencies and civil society partners within Ghana challenged the results particularly the findings related to linkages between learning outcomes and infrastructure development.

4.2. New approaches to education assistance: EFA and FTI

The Education for All and its associated Fast Track Initiative (EFA/FTI) was set up in 2002 by donors to help developing countries reach the UN's target of getting all children of school-going age into primary school by 2015.¹⁹ The EFA/FTI contains a direct funding mechanism through its "catalytic fund" and seeks to 'bridge global commitments and local implementation around a set of reciprocal obligations: For the low-income countries to develop and implement sound education programmes, and for donors to support such programmes with finance and with enhanced efforts at harmonization, coordination, and acceleration.' (UNDP, 2005: 4).

Ghana was one of 16 countries which in June 2002 were selected by the FTI secretariat on a number of criteria, including the existence of a poverty reduction strategy and 'a demonstrated upward trend in performance in primary education and domestic financing' (UNDP, 2005: 4). Under the initiative, £500 million was to be disbursed to 16 countries, including Ghana, beginning in 2006 (Taylor, 2005). Indeed, the recent increase in primary school enrolment in Ghana is said to be partly due to the benefits of FTI and more recently the capitation grant. Despite the high expectation of additional financing through the FTI mechanism, there remains a question currently as to whether Ghana will continue to benefit from FTI due to its ability to meet the basic FTI financing criteria.

4.3. Partnership in the early 2000s

¹⁹ For a critical assessment of the EFA/FTI, see Rose (2005).

A 2004 World Bank publication notes that the effectiveness of development support to Ghana's education sector had a long way to go in the early 2000s: 'Official development assistance in education is substantial, but its transaction costs are high; it is poorly coordinated, rarely leads to genuine stakeholder-owned interventions, and has only a marginal impact on the sector (World Bank, 2004c: 7).'

While support from DPs is 'substantial' and 'significant' at 8.5% of 2001 discretionary expenditures, it has had mixed impact. For example, the DPs' pledges of adopting SWAp in education have 'not yet materialized' and until 2003 'the education arena was marked by an accumulation of uncoordinated initiatives' (World Bank, 2004c: 7-8).

While DP support to the 1987 education reform and to the 1996 fCUBE strategy had some features of an education SWAp (noted above), by the early 2000s a SWAp had still not fully emerged in Ghana's education sector. This was not helped by the fact that in 2001 there was 'no one programme uniformly supported by all donors and there [was] a lack of coherence in the overall sector, with several policy documents defining education programmes' (Sibbons, 2001: 12). Casely-Hayford (2002) found that a SWAp within the education sector in Ghana would require the following:

- A common basket of funding and consolidated financial approach to ensuring the steady and timely flow of resources both domestic and foreign was available. (This is in line with the Education for All initiative, which states that any country able to prepare a plan for the sector, which passes a quality control mechanism, will be given support needed to execute its plans).
- Cohesive and cost effective plans (identifying the relevant implementers) which avoids any duplication of interventions.
- Targets and mechanisms for monitoring/evaluating progress towards these simple targets.
- A set of mutually agreed upon benchmarks or triggers to identify when funds should be released to the sector on a *bi-annual basis*. A regular and consolidated reporting system, including narrative and financial statements, to all development partners and government stakeholders.
- Internal and external audit systems to ensure transparency and accountability on funds to all the sub sectors.

Casely-Hayford (2002) found that:

The planning and implementation modalities for a SWAp in the education sector do not have to be complex and elaborate. The most effective plans are often simplistic and take cognisance of the limited implementation capacity at central and district levels.²⁰ The SWAp should start with a modest beginning providing a framework for bottom up planning for educational development in the future thereby empowering the districts and regional departments. More precisely this

²⁰ Elaborate plans and costing were carried out during the fCUBE reform but little was actually implemented since the planning did not involve all the stakeholders particularly those at the community and district level.

would mean that community based and district based initiatives could be gradually integrated into the education sector planning process in order to ensure ownership and leadership by the people. This is in keeping with the process of decentralisation and development planning articulated in many of Ghana's vision of development documents.

Unfortunately, this bottom up approach to education sector planning has not been fully achieved and has taken the MOESS several years to orient districts of the need to provide their annual plans as part of the overall educational planning process. The financial arrangements for ensuring that district plans are fully incorporated into the budgeting process and supported remains a major challenge.

An overarching challenge for the MoESS today remains that lack of harmonised reporting requirements and donor competition which undermines the functional capacity, and ability to sustain reform processes within the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (MoEYS).

Donor-specific requirements drain much of the already weak MoEYS analytical and planning capacity. DPs compete for the few available skilled staff to champion their own programmes. Most of the strategies and plans drafted under such conditions are regarded as externally imposed. (World Bank, 2004c: 8)

Aware of these issues, the MoESS took major steps to in early 2002 to better coordinate DP support. A DP coordinator was appointed in the MoEYS and regular DP meetings were held (World Bank, 2004c: 8). New mechanisms also evolved under the 2003-2015 Education Strategic Plan(ESP) (see below) to address better coordination, ensure partnership (e.g. the Education Sector Technical Advisory Committee – see below) and strengthen the oversight to the MoESS planning process.

Furthermore, the move towards MDBS (starting from 2003 – see below) and the Ghana Partnership Strategy (including the Joint Assistance Strategy; on both see below) should further help to improve DP coordination.

5.0. Partnerships and frameworks in Ghana's education sector: 2003 and beyond

5.1. The 2003-2015 Education Strategic Plan

Since 2003, the GoG has moved towards a Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp) in education that attempts to bring external funding under one comprehensive education plan, the Education Strategic Plan (ESP), 2003-2015 (GoG, 2003a).

The ESP is based on the GPRS I (GoG, 2003b), the 2002 Presidential Commission Report (see below), the EFA, Dakar Goals and the MDGs. It was developed with support from some of the DPs primarily the DfID and UNICEF. The ESP focus is on basic education, but it also emphasises the need to support post-basic education (Palmer, 2005b; Palmer, 2005c). The ESP has four main areas of focus (GoG, 2003a):

1. Equitable access to education;
2. Quality of education;
3. Educational management;
4. Science, technology and TVET.

The ESP uses a SWAp approach with government leading the process and donors helping to support the overall vision and plans within the education sector (GoG, 2003a: 34). It notes that:

The basic education sub-sector is of great significance within the education sector. Ghana subscribes to the Education For All (EFA) principles... [However] it is important to stress... that the ESP is a whole sector plan. The Government and the Ministry is committed to a whole-sector development approach, i.e. a sector wide approach (SWAp), in which every sub-sector and every area of focus within the education sector is considered. (GoG, 2003a: 11)

Donor support for the ESP in Ghana represents perhaps the most extensive manifestation of a SWAp in the Ghanaian context to date.²¹ According to Volume I of the ESP, the SWAp allows ‘responsibility for sector planning to [rest] with government, supported by partnerships with the home, schools, and wider communities’ (GoG, 2003a: 4). Most DP funding to education has therefore been situated within the ESP framework in the form of a SWAp (*Table 3*). However, an interesting feature of external support to education in Ghana ‘is that the forms of support range from projects to budget support, underscoring the diverse nature of what constitutes a SWAp’ (DFID, 2005a: 8). For example, while the World Bank (through poverty reduction support credits) and DFID (through poverty reduction budget support) channel much of their funding through multi-donor budgetary support (since 2003 - see below), other DPs (e.g., USAID, JICA) still maintain specific projects.

The MoEYS and the majority of DP’s remain committed to the establishment of a SWAp, ‘although in the short term, not all are expected to fully engage with the process’ (DFID, 2004: 3). As an interim step to establishing a pooled funding mechanism, DFID and the World Bank (as well as funds committed by the Netherlands, and grants from several donors under the EFA/FTI via the Catalytic Fund) ‘will share a common financing arrangement within MoEYS’ (*ibid*).

²¹ As noted above, it can be argued that external support to the 1987 education reforms and fCUBE both had elements of a SWAp.

Table 3. Development Partners support for Education Strategic Plan

Development partner / agency	Forms of support to the 2003-2015 Education Strategic Plan (ESP)
DFID	Support to the Education Strategic Plan (SESP); focus on improving physical facilities at the basic education level.
French Embassy	Support for French teaching and teacher-training in schools, colleges and university.
JICA	Construction of schools, classrooms and accommodation; National Computer and Science Resource Centre; Science, Technology and Mathematics project (STM); teacher education.
The Netherlands	In partnership with DFID; probable support using SESP approach, pooling funds in the same Education Fund; probable support for school feeding.
USAID	Education Quality for All - EQUALL Project; re-introduction of regular testing in primary schools; HIV/AIDS education; Safe School program; Girls' Scholarships.
European Union	TA support to PBME Department of MoES; Construction of schools, teacher's quarters, and day care centres, under micro-projects programme)
UNESCO	Teacher Training Institutions HRD; EFA National Action Plan and ESP; Community Learning Centres; EMIS support via UNESCO Institute for Statistics, funded by World Bank under EdSeP.
UNICEF	National Capacity Enhancement; child-school community process; early psycho-social and intellectual stimulation; school-mapping.
WFP	Assistance to Girls' Education in the three northern regions, particularly through school feeding and take-home rations.
AfDB	Primary Education Rehabilitation Project; Senior Secondary Education Project, including construction of one model school in each District.
The World Bank	Education Sector Project, EdSeP, with support to the ESP through: (A) Sector Capacity Building, particularly within MoES, (B) Pilot Programmatic Scheme (PPS) in 40 most deprived districts, (C) Teaching and Learning Innovation Fund (TALIF) in tertiary institutions.

Source: DFID, 2005a: 7-8

What is also clear from Table 3 is that ‘the thrust of [DP support to the education]... sector... is at the primary level’ (AfDB, 2005: 15). For example, the new DFID education programme, the Support to Education Strategic Plan (SESP) (2005-2009) (DFID, 2004; 2005a),²² (UK £50 million), has as its goal the achievement of education goals under the MDGs within Ghana (DFID, 2005a). In this regard, support is targeted at basic education (primary and JSS levels).²³ The DFID SESP is justified in economic terms by the potentially large benefits to Ghana of achieving UPE (DFID, 2005a).²⁴

To oversee the ESP process, in 2004 the MoE set up the Education Sector Technical Advisory Committee (ESTAC), along with thematic groups for the following areas: equitable access to education; quality of education; education management; science and technology; and TVET. The aim of the committee was to ‘oversee the work of the

²² The SESP was postponed until DFID-Ghana was clear about the intentions of the GoG to follow their PRSP and Education Strategic Plan, both of which have a strong commitment to basic education. There is some concern among donors, including DFID, over the new White Paper on Educational Reforms which has a more ‘post-basic’ feel to it (see Palmer, 2005c: section 3.11). The SESP was therefore extended until late 2005 when it was expected that government policy would be clearer.

²³ The aid modality adopted by the SESP is Sector Budget Support: All funds would pass through a single account in the MoEYS.

²⁴ What is interesting, however, is that most evidence on the outcomes of education now points to declining returns to basic, and especially primary, education in Ghana; returns are higher for higher levels of education (Palmer, 2007b).

thematic groups and to take overall responsibility for advising and following through on the proposals of the ESP' (GoG, 2005a: 77).

Its members were to come from the following institutions and agencies:

- Private sector, NGOs and CBOs;
- Denominational boards and management;
- School management committees and/or parents teacher associations;
- Ministries of Local Government; Health; Finance and Economic Planning; Employment and Manpower;
- Regions and districts;
- Development partners, including external funding agencies.

Leadership of the thematic groups was as follows:

- | | |
|---------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| • Equitable access | Director of Basic Education Division |
| • Quality Education | Director, Inspectorate Division |
| • Educational Management | Director, PBME |
| • Science, Technology, and TVET | Director, TVET |

By the start of 2005, apart from a few meetings with DPs, meetings of the thematic groups had 'not yet been established on a regular basis', according to the preliminary education sector performance reports (GoG, 2005a). 'This was undermining the SWAp process [in the education sector] as stakeholders and MoES staff did not have the opportunity to discuss, through an organized forum, issues on their key areas of focus' (GoG, 2005a: 5). With DPs' assistance and the information needs required for the Annual Education Sector review process (AESR), efforts were made to make the thematic groups functional and relevant. But problems, both in terms of commitment and representation, remain:

[T]here is still an imbalance in the representation at the thematic group and ESTAC meetings. Under the terms of the ESP, membership of these groups would include NGOs, CBOs, FBO, and other civil society representatives. At present, this representation is limited, and effectiveness of the work of the groups is thus affected (GoG, 2005a: 79).

In addition to the ESTAC, there are two other sector-coordinating structures within the education sector:

- the Development Partner Coordination Group - the education coordination Group is led by the GoG and is composed of the World Bank, DFID, EU, France, GTZ, JICA, ILO, UNESCO, UNICEF, and USAID.
- the Education Sector Annual Review which is a yearly review used to analyse progress made and district level in relation to the targets set out in the Education Sector Plan (ESP).

5.2. 'Dual-track' policy making: Harmonising the Education Strategic Plan (ESP) and the White Paper on Education Reforms

Parallel to the ESP process, and one year after the change in government - in January 2002 -²⁵ GoG commissioned a Committee of Review of Educational Reforms in Ghana, chaired by Professor Anamuah-Mensah.²⁶ In October 2002, the committee issued its report, *Meeting the Challenges of Education in the Twenty First Century* (GoG, 2002a), also referred to as the 2002 Presidential Commission Report. The government reviewed the report and issued *The White Paper on the Report of the Education Reform Review Committee* (GoG, 2004a).²⁷ The White Paper, among other things, proposed the following:

- Universal and compulsory basic education should be extended to include two years of pre-school teaching at the kindergarten level, making basic education in Ghana eleven years in length (2 years KG, 6 years primary, 3 years junior high school);
- At the primary level fewer subjects would be taught so that 'grounding in the basic skills [literacy, numeracy, problem-solving skills and creative arts]... would be improved' (GoG, 2004a: 6);
- The present Junior Secondary School (JSS) system, that includes an element of pre-vocational and pre-technical skills training, will be discontinued. In place of the current JSS, will be the renamed 'Junior High School' (JHS), with a more general, comprehensive curriculum;
- Senior Secondary School will be renamed 'Senior High School' (SHS), extended from three to four years, and diversified into four streams: vocational, technical, agricultural and general education.
- The government intends to partner with the private sector to promote formal apprenticeship training programmes, with government assuming 'full responsibility' for the first year of the programme.

Some DPs have been concerned about some of the reform proposals in the white paper and have made these known to the GoG. These concerns have centred on three main issues: (1) cost of reforms, (2) lack of congruence between the white paper's proposed reforms and those of the ESP,²⁸ and (3) assumptions underlying the white paper's reforms.²⁹ DP-GoG dialogue over the white paper reforms also touches on the congruence between these reforms and the ESP. While the GoG remains publicly committed to the implementation of the ESP, it also appears to be very committed to the white paper, which has a renewed emphasis on pre-school education, senior secondary schooling, and vocational training. Some DPs see the white paper reforms as 'weakening the focus' on

²⁵ It was noted above that the New Patriotic Party (NPP) came to power in January 2001. The ESP, White Paper, and presidential commission report were all tied to this change of government.

²⁶ Vice-Chancellor of the University of Education, Winneba.

²⁷ Hereafter referred to as the 'white paper reforms'.

²⁸ Most of the DPs have designed their support in line with the ESP and are hence concerned about an apparent shift in GoG priorities, signalled in the White Paper. Agency staff and technical assistance personnel were involved in the design and preparation of the ESP, but not the White Paper.

²⁹ For a critique of the white paper reforms, see Palmer, 2005c: 66-72.

the ESP and as potentially shifting the focus away from primary education. This has led DPs to characterise the current educational policy making process in Ghana as following a ‘dual-track’. A 2005 internal review of education progress by one bilateral DP in Ghana commented on the apparent incongruence between the ESP and the white paper reforms:

There are, however, some unwelcome trends and significant risks ahead. There is an apparent shift in resource allocation in favour of higher education and away from primary education. There is a weakening emphasis on the Education Strategic Plan and agreed annual programmes of work in favour of proposed reforms, including vocationalisation, which have great cost implications and limited prospects of success (Taylor,2005).

Nonetheless, while all the DPs in Ghana clearly have concerns over (sometimes different) parts of the white paper reforms, the DPs accept that this reform is something that the GoG is going ahead with and that they should respect the decisions made by the GoG. As an education advisor for a multilateral agency in Ghana noted, they have to respect the right of countries to reform their educational system if they feel that the current system is not meeting their needs or future aspirations.³⁰

In late 2005, the Ministry of Education and Sports (MoES) sought to spell out the white paper costing as well as the white paper-ESP linkage to facilitate DP-GoG discussions. It produced two documents in September and November 2005 entitled *Update of the Education Sector Financing Model to Take Account of the Government White Paper Proposals*, and *Linking the ESP and White Paper Reforms*, respectively. These documents do highlight the linkages between the ESP and the white paper reforms. Firstly, they argue that the white paper and the ESP share a common commitment that all children are provided with the foundation of high quality free basic education. Secondly, they make the link between the ESP’s objective that ‘every sub-sector and every area of focus within the education sector is considered’ (GoG, 2003a: 11) and the white paper reforms at the second-cycle level.

While some DPs believe that the simultaneous implementation of the ESP and white paper reforms amounts to the pursuit of a ‘dual track’ in education policy making and reforms in Ghana, the GoG, through these two documents, appears to counter these charges by seeking to demonstrate that they not only complement each other but in fact reflect domestically determined priorities for linking education to national development. Nonetheless, these two MoES documents make it clear that the targets for education and training set in the ESP have to be revised as a result of the white paper reforms³¹. As a result of the white paper reforms, the funding gap for education sector reforms increased to US\$290 million. Since part of this funding gap is expected to be filled by donors, DPs

³⁰ Palmer interview with an Education Advisor of a multilateral agency in Ghana, 18.11.04, Accra.

³¹ For example, the projected recurrent resources required by the TVET sector in 2015 were estimated at 1.6%. As a result of the White Paper reforms, this estimate has been revised upwards by the MOES to 10.3%; in other words, by 2015 the MOES estimates that over 10% of the recurrent expenditure in the education sector will be spent on TVET. Moreover, the total funding gap for the ESP targets was some US\$60.2 million by 2015.

and the GoG have to reach agreement over the white paper reforms. In the end, the preference of some DPs, such as USAID and DFID, for a focus on primary (or basic) education and the GoG's insistence on increasing investment in the SSS and TVET sub-sectors has proven to be a source of tension between GoG-donor relations in education sector reform particularly over the last few years as demonstrated in the 2007 Annual Education Sector Review meeting.

5.3. Multi Donor Budgetary Support (MDBS) and education reforms

Since 2003, 10 bilateral and multilateral donors have agreed to provide co-ordinated support to Ghana's budget, in support of the GPRS, through a Multi Donor Budgetary Support (MDBS) mechanism.³² The framework allows a fixed amount to support the GoG budget with the rest dependant on achievement of mutually agreed goals to support the Government's own Poverty Reduction Plan (the GPRS). Government has agreed a new Poverty Reduction Budget Support (PRBS) programme with Ghana's DPs for the period 2006–2008. Overall DP budget support is estimated at US\$300 million per annum.³³

DFID has been a key architect of MDBS arrangements, including policy coherence and harmonisation between the World Bank, European Commission, and bilateral donors. According to DFID (2005b), donors often try to bypass governments and in doing so they actually weaken institutions that deliver essential services like education. On the basis of this realization, DFID (2005b) proposes that foreign aid be tailored to suit the government's policy priorities, using governments' budgeting and control mechanisms as conduits.

MDBS represents a shift towards a new partnership paradigm and is already having some positive impact on the education sector. For example, MDBS has 'supported the government's programme to introduce innovative and comprehensive approaches to education. These approaches included eliminating fees, providing grants, sponsoring teacher training in rural areas, delivering textbooks and transferring budgetary resources to districts' (World Bank, 2007: 7) (*see also Box 5*).

Box 5. Benefits of Multi Donor Budget Support in Ghana

Providing Direct Budget Support has real benefits:

³² MDBS is a mechanism that allows DPs to pool funding which is then spent directly by the GoG on health, education, infrastructure and more. The MDBS members are Denmark, Germany, Holland, United Kingdom, Canada, Switzerland and France (since 2005), alongside the World Bank/IMF, the AfDB and the European Union. Notably absent are the USA and Japan, which insist upon separate aid arrangements.

³³ DFID Ghana website, available through www.dfid.gov.uk

i) Predictability of aid and donor harmonisation – budget support now accounts for about 40% of all aid to Ghana. MDBS allows for greater predictability for the GoG in planning its budget and reduces the administration involved in dealing with different donors. It provides a shared approach to assessing progress and a structure for discussion between Ghana and donors about priorities for poverty reduction and growth.

ii) Alongside debt relief, budget support has been central in supporting the first sustained period of macro-economic stability creating the conditions for economic growth (about 6%).

iii) In turn macroeconomic stability has supported one of the fastest and linear rates of headcount poverty reduction in Africa. Income poverty declined from 42% in 1999 to around 39% in 2005: 500,000 Ghanaians were lifted out of poverty during the GPRS I period (2003-2005) alone.

iv) Budget support has complemented the Government's own resource allocation for poverty reduction and been influential to the Government's Resource Targeting. Poverty spending (excluding donor contributions) accounted for around 8.2% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2005 (compared to 4.8% in 2002). In dollar terms this represents a 100% increase in spend between 2002 and 2005. This has, for example, allowed the employment of around 10,000 new teachers a year, the building of 440 new classroom blocks for basic level schools and the removal all fees and levies on basic education (effective since the start of the 2005/06 academic year); this latter policy has led to a 14% increase in enrolment in the 50 most deprived districts. Moreover, many more poor communities in the northern and remote areas of Ghana now have improved access to schools.

vi) Budget support has also facilitated the timely release of the District Assembly Common Fund, the main form of transfer from the centre to districts which is used for small scale development Projects, including in education and skills development. From being up to three quarters in arrears in 2002, the Fund has moved to being more or less current in its releases.

vii) Budget support has strengthened the relevance and coherence of the budget process – Ghana has gone from scoring one out of 16 Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) public financial management benchmarks to 8 in 2005.

But support to the Government's budget also presents risk, for example: the threat of high levels of Government borrowing in the run-up to the 2008 elections; the weak capacity in Government leads to an inability to meet the GPRS targets on time. To mitigate these, the MDBS donor monitors:

- i) The extent of domestic revenue used for poverty reduction programmes;
- ii) The timeliness and transparency of government financial reporting and auditing;
- iii) Value for money in government spending, especially procurement;
- iv) Sound macro-economic management.

Source: DFID Ghana site (April 2007), available at www.dfid.gov.uk; DFID, 2006

The preference of the GoG is increasingly for direct budgetary support as the GoG sees this aid modality as being able to 'assist education sector planning and management' (GoG, 2003a: 36). In contrast, the ESP is strongly against uncoordinated off-budget support; not just from DPs, but from a wide array of 'partners':

Extensive ‘off-budget’ support, through uncoordinated projects and inputs, whether from donors, lenders, non-public sector NGOs, CBOs, FBOs or the private sector can make it difficult to plan properly and to use resources effectively. Growth in the external support to education, while generally welcomed by beneficiaries when it reaches them, can place a heavy institutional burden on a line ministry such as MoE. A number of constraints can arise from lack of aid co-ordination:

- continuous visitations and numerous progress reports and reviews
- proliferation of uncoordinated projects
- duplication of effort
- parallel management units
- high administrative costs
- lack of country ownership
- cost and time overruns
- poor sustainability (*ibid.*)

However, the early experience some DPs have had with MDBS in Ghana (since 2003) has not all been positive. For example, budgetary support ‘has shown an initial bias towards the expansion of public services, rather than their quality’ (DFID, 2006: 8); in the case of education, this translates into an expansion of the overall number of schools without the same impetus on raising the quality of schooling in Ghana. Hence some MDBS development partners (e.g., DFID, the Dutch and the EC), while channelling increasing amounts of development assistance through MDBS, still maintain dedicated sector support instruments in education in parallel to MDBS. This dedicated sector financing provides additional financing to the sectors that are considered DP priorities, for example improving schooling quality. For DFID this will be the case ‘until the environment is fully conducive to the effective and sustainable development of better quality public goods and services’ (DFID, 2006: 8).

5.4. Harmonization and alignment since 2005

The process of dialogue and harmonisation with regards to aid for Ghana has taken a step forward since the signing in February 2005, of the Ghana/partners document. *Harmonization and Alignment in Ghana for Aid Effectiveness* (GoG/DP, 2005a) (*see Box 6*).

Box 6. *Harmonization and Alignment in Ghana for Aid Effectiveness* (February 2005)

The Government of Ghana (GoG) and Development Partners DPs commit themselves to the following principles:

- i) Recognize Ghanaian **leadership and ownership** of the development process and model all development assistance on that premise.
- ii) Continue the development of a **GPRS-based monitoring and evaluation system** producing progressively better data which increasingly informs both GoG policy and DP allocations.
- iii) Increase the **predictability of aid flows**, ensure the timely disbursement of resources and work together to strengthen public financial management.
- iv) Increase the **use of country systems** to deliver assistance, align assistance with Ghana's planning and budget cycles and give GoG greater control over the allocation and management of development resources.
- v) Increasingly use the strengthened **national procurement** system.
- vi) Continue to foster **sector harmonization**.
- vii) Maximise **complementarity and shared resources** among donors to increase effectiveness and reduce transaction costs.
- viii) Work together to increase the sustainability and impact of **capacity development**.
- ix) Further develop and strengthen **mutual accountability**.
- x) Maximise where possible the use of **untied and unearmarked aid**.

Source: GoG/DP, 2005a: 2

The Ghana/partners document (GoG/DP, 2005a) was presented in March 2005 at the Paris meeting of the OECD/DAC,³⁴ and then finalised in the action plan during the working party meeting in November 2005, *discussed below* (GoG/DP, 2005b).

The GoG and its DPs held a Consultative Group/ Annual Partnership Meeting (CG/APM) in Accra on November 7-8, 2005. The objective of the meeting was to build the foundation for a new Ghana Partnership Strategy (GPS) that aligns DPs' support to the outcomes articulated in the GPRS II (*see below*). In addition to strengthening strategic alignment, the GPS, which is to enhance the focus on monitoring results, will support new ways to improve the effectiveness of the partnership, and will lay the basis for more predictable funding (GoG/DP, 2005b; G-JAS, 2007). The GPS was endorsed at this November 2005 CG/APM and updated for the CG/APM in June 2006.

In November 2005, the GoG published its second poverty reduction plan, the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS II, 2006-2009), which donors have agreed to support. The main pillars of this strategy are:

- Human development and basic services (*see Box 7*).
- Good governance and civic responsibility
- Agriculture and private sector competitiveness for growth.

Box 7. Education and Training Priorities in the GPRS II

³⁴ Since signing the Paris Declaration in March 2005, Ghana has become one of the most active players in the global dialogue on aid effectiveness and harmonization. Successful efforts at the national level attracted international attention: Ghana has become the vice-chair of the OECD/DAC Working Party on Aid Effectiveness – the main international forum between donor and recipient countries on how to make aid more effective. In fact, the next locus of the High Level Forum in 2008, dedicated to aid, was decided to be Ghana (UNDP, 2006).

Priorities in the education sector include: increase access to and participation in education and training at all levels; bridge gender gaps in access to education in all districts; improve the quality of teaching and learning; improve efficiency in the delivery of education services; promote science and technology education at all levels with particular attention to increased participation of girls.

Training, skills and entrepreneurial development will be guided by the following priorities: provision of skills and entrepreneurial training in a gender responsive and equitable manner; promotion of dialogue between industry and skills/professional training institutions to produce skilled labour required by industry; strengthening of and support human resource training institutions; promotion of training in apprenticeship; promotion of the adoption of the National Youth Policy and enactment of the Disability Bill.

Source: GoG, 2005b: xxvi

In February 2007, the Ghana Joint Assistance Strategy (G-JAS) (G-JAS, 2007) was published, a strategy that emerged from the GPS agreements in 2005 and 2006. The G-JAS is a DP initiative aimed at improving the alignment of development assistance with the core business of Government and the Government's political and partnership cycle. It builds on commitments by DPs to work toward the achievement of goals and priorities of the GPRS II and to accelerate progress against mutually defined harmonization principles (G-JAS, 2007).

The G-JAS involves the majority of Ghana's GPS development partners (representing about 95% of ODA flows).³⁵ The time frame for the G-JAS is four years, starting in 2007 and ending in 2010 (*Box 8*).

Box 8. Expected achievements by the end of the G-JAS period (2007-2010)

- i) higher quality dialogue between DPs and the government;
- ii) improved aid delivery through a better division of labour and a solid process for deciding who does what;
- iii) greater harmonisation in the way development assistance is delivered;
- iv) increased reliance on programme based modalities and coordinated technical assistance programmes that support government priorities;
- v) improved predictability in resource flows and reduced transactions costs for government; and
- vi) better alignment of DP country strategies and resource allocations with GPRS II goals and priorities.

Source: G-JAS, 2007: 2

With regard to education, the G-JAS partners are focussed on the achievement on the MDGs (*Box 9*) and aligned in support of the GoG priorities (*see annex 3 and 4*).

Box 9. Expected focus of G-JAS partners' assistance to education during 2007-2010

³⁵ G-JAS partners include: Canada, Denmark, EC, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, UK, USA, AfDB, IFAD, UN and the World Bank.

In support of improved educational outcomes and accelerated achievement of the MDGs, the G-JAS partners will focus on increasing access, completion and quality in basic education, particularly the six-year cycle of primary schooling, and specific measures, such as incentive schemes, to increase girls' enrolment, retention and completion, particularly in secondary education. G-JAS partners will work with the Ministries of Education and Finance to improve efficiency and equity in education financing at all levels, particularly in pursuit of a more sustainable and equitable system of funding for tertiary education. Partners are working with government to develop a SWAp within which support will be provided.

Source: G-JAS, 2007: 30

In support of Government's **overall** development strategy, DPs committed to make available US \$1.2 billion in 2006, the first year of the GPRS II (GOG/DP, 2005b); total projected disbursements for the 2007-2010 period is estimated at over US\$ 5 billion (*Table 4*).

Table 4. Prospective G-JAS Financial Flows: 2007-2010

Aid instruments / GPRS II sector	Total Projected Disbursement (US\$ mn)				
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2007- 2010
Total Projected Disbursements	1,292.7	1,382.9	1,434.7	1,255.0	5,365.3
of which:					
Budget Support (MDBS)	293.6	354.6	378.1	361.2	1,387.5
Direct Support to Civil Society	16.8	16.1	12.9	11.9	57.7
Sector and Investment Support	982.3	1,012.2	1,043.7	881.9	3,920.1
of which:					
Education	99.2	110.2	103.5	98.0	411.9

Source: G-JAS, 2007: 28

5.5. A broader view of partnership and involving the civil society sector

While 'partnership' in this review has largely focused on DP-GoG interaction, the term includes not only the relations between the state and donors but also the private sector and civil society, broadly, including NGOs. Support to the education sector by NGOs has been diverse. They have concentrated largely on capacity building, infrastructure development and direct sponsorship to children particularly girls. One of the other areas where CSO's have been active is in the field of complementary education whereby they provide accelerated educational programs which help children attain basic literacy within a shorter period and more flexible time for poor children³⁶ (Casely-Hayford and Ghartey, 2007). Other NGO's provide funds for the construction of classrooms and training of teachers; food rations, as well as lunches (*Box 10*).

Box 10. NGO support to Ghana's education sector and outcomes

³⁶ Over 80,000 children have been reached by the School for Life Literacy program in northern Ghana since 1995. A recent Impact assessment of their work suggests that the program is extremely effective particularly in hard to reach areas where trained teachers refuse postings (Casely-Hayford and Ghartey, 2007).

‘Possibly the most successful support provided by development partners for children in school in deprived areas has been school feeding programmes. Catholic Relief Services (CRS) covers approximately 90% of schools in rural schools in the three northern regions. CRS conducted a methodologically rigorous impact assessment of its school feeding programme, and found that school feeding could account for 26% of the increase in gross enrolments from 1996 to 2000. Moreover, the increased attendance rate of girls overall and relative to boys could be attributed to the ‘take-home ration’ targeted at girls’ (GoG/DFID, 2003: section 4.9).

‘Various reports suggest that non-formal initiatives which support out-of-school children (for instance, Action Aid’s Shepherd Schools and School for Life) are effective in educating children, and possibly more cost effective than formal education particularly in remote rural areas of Ghana (GoG/DFID, 2003: section 4.9).

However, it has been noted that much of the support from the NGO sector has been uncoordinated, leading to a number of problems, including proliferation and duplication of programmes and projects; parallel management units; as well as lack of national ownership. Also, successful programmes piloted by NGOs do not come to the attention of the MoES and, therefore, the lessons learned from such pilots are not available for evaluation and other studies in the education sector (GoG, 2005a).

One of the greatest challenges in the education sector is the relationship between the civil society sector and the Ministry of Education. Several opportunities have arisen over the last fifteen years where the CSO sector could have helped to implement various piloted projects which were ready for scale in order to enhance educational development but agreement over the approach for collaboration could not be reached.³⁷ The Multi donor budgetary support mechanisms have also weakened civil societies sector’s bargaining power and ultimately their ability to work for the Ministry since funding is channelled directly to Government. The MDBS has not been designed to utilise the full potential of civil society (ODI, 2007). This review has revealed that while a large focus of donors and government has been to optimise the coordination, financial mechanisms and restructuring within the education sector, the civil society sector has not been fully involved nor incorporated within these processes.

There has been some level of acknowledgement by the MOESS of the potential of civil society to contribute to educational development particularly in deprived rural areas. Systematic and concerted efforts made over the last two years through the efforts of two major NGO coalitions (the Ghana National Education Coalition Campaign and the Northern Network for Education and Development) are helping to increase the voice of the civil society sector particularly in relation to their appraisal of issues proceeding the Annual Education Sector Reviews and equity issues across Ghana (Casely-Hayford and Ghartey, 2007). The MOESS is also realising that the NGO sector may be able to play a vital role in providing basic education to deprived areas and meeting some of the EFA goals through the complementary education efforts being implemented through NGO’s such as School for Life. A complementary education policy document has just been

³⁷ The World Bank Schooling Improvement Fund (SIF) and the World University Service of Canada Girls Education Program are two examples to date.

completed by the MOESS with inputs from civil society and is the first step towards bridging the gaps which exist between state and non state providers of education.

6. Partnerships and outcomes in Ghana's skills development sector

This section focuses on skills development, but starts with a word on DP involvement in formal post-basic education. Since 1990 and the Education for All Conference, some DPs have funded areas other than basic education, with the World Bank being the largest supporter of post-basic education in Ghana. Between 1991 and 1998, two investment projects complemented the two EdSACs, namely the Community Secondary School Construction (CSSP) project (1991-95) and the Tertiary Education Project (1992-98). In 2004 the World Bank launched its Education Sector Project (EdSeP), which is planned to run from May 2004 – October 2009 (see World Bank, 2004c). There are three main components of the EdSeP:

- Sector Management Capacity Building: To build capacity at all levels of the educational system between and within organizations in the sector; improve the quality of leadership and management in the sector
- Pilot Programme Scheme – applies to basic education.
- Tertiary Education Innovation – applies to tertiary education.

The EdSeP 'seeks to promote efficiency, equity, and quality at all levels of the education system and to boost access at the basic level and relevance at the tertiary level' (World Bank, 2004c: 3). However, any explicit targeting of Senior Secondary education is notable by its absence. The origins of EdSeP also reveal something of the donor-government interaction. In 2000 the Ghanaian government sought the Bank's support to solely 'initiate the recovery of tertiary education' (World Bank, 2004c: 20). However, as the Bank prepared to respond a common view was developed that weak management at all levels of the sector would undermine any attempt to improve the situation, and that any new operation would need to address the issue of overall sector management to be successful. Consequently, the concept of a project exclusively devoted to a single sub-sector was dropped (World Bank, 2004c: 20).

Technical and vocational skills development (including TVET) has been an area where the GoG has consistently, and repeatedly, reiterated its desire to develop further – as the sector was seen as one of the solutions to the unemployed school-leaver problem (Palmer, 2005a; Palmer, 2007a). In spite of this, TVET in Ghana has received little actual support from DPs or government (Palmer, 2007a; World Bank, 2004b). This is due, among other things, to a lack of demand for TVET, few opportunities for TVET graduates, and the GoG not learning from its past attempts at promoting TVET (Palmer, 2007a). In 2005 the estimated total expenditure on TVET (in the MoE) was 1.4% of total education spending (GoG, 2005a). In 2002 the MoMYE allocated 12% of its budget to the TVET sector (GoG, 2002: 12). Donor spending on TVET in 2005 was estimated at just 0.9% of total donor spending in the education sector.

Despite this, there have been a number of DPs engaged in various TVET-related programmes in Ghana³⁸, including: (i) the World Bank Vocational Skills and Informal Sector support project (VSP) (1995-01); (ii) DFID (NVTI Centres Support Project, 1996-1998); (iii) UNICEF (support to establishing the Integrated Community Centres for Employable Skills (ICCES), 1987-1992); (iv) JICA (support to development of TVET policy framework; other small-scale support to ICCES; new Technical Vocational Education and Training Support (TVETS) Project, to commence 2006); (v) GTZ (e.g. support to Takoradi Technical Institute, 1977-2005); (vi) Netherlands (support to 20 VOTEC Resource Centres in some TVET institutions (1999-2003) and, in 2006, support to the new Ghana Industrial Skills Development Centre at Tema; (vii) NGOs³⁹ small-scale support to ICCES (1986-2006).

Annex 2 of this review summarises GoG initiatives and external agency support from the late 1950s/ early 1960s onwards with regard to skills development. What Annex 2 highlights is that, for the most case, DP support has consisted of a series of specific projects without any overall framework for coordination.

While, in many cases, this support has improved the quality in individual training institutions, it has not had an impact on the national TVET system (JICA/GoG, 2005: 22) – partly because that support has targeted individual beneficiary institutions and also because TVET is spread across numerous different ministries. According to JICA, the TVET system in Ghana is so fragmented and spread across so many different ministries and agencies that ‘not even the government have [sic] a full-clear picture of the situation’ (GoJ, 2004: 3).

In fact, since the late-1990s, JICA has been assisting the GoG in the development of a TVET policy framework. In 2004, the GoG produced a draft framework (GoG, 2004b), though this has been some eight years in the making. The Government has recently (July 2006) passed into law the Council for TVET (COTVET) Bill, which will bring COTVET into existence; a body intended to replace the weak NACVET to coordinate TVET policy in Ghana (see Palmer, 2007a for a discussion on these developments). JICA’s involvement in the development of the TVET Policy Framework is an important example of donor involvement in the policy planning frameworks of the GoG.

7. Conclusions

³⁸ This section on donor support to TVET draws on Palmer (2007a).

³⁹ Included among these non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are faith-based organisations (FBOs) and community-based organisations (CBOs). There are also numerous types of NGOs engaged in TVET support, varying from non-profit NGOs, to business-NGOs (BUNGOS), quasi-NGOs (QUANGOs) and political-NGOs (PONGOs).

Current primary school enrolment is increasing faster than the school-age population. Enrolment ratios are increasing, but progress towards Universal Primary Education (UPE) has been steady rather than rapid. Ghana is judged to be on track to achieve MDG 2 (UPE) by 2015 and has made good progress in reducing poverty (*Box 11*).

Box 11. Ghana's MDG progress in poverty reduction and education

Government has made **very good progress** in reducing **headcount poverty** nationwide and in the three poorest Northern regions, where access to basic social services has improved significantly, albeit from a low base. Nationally, poverty has fallen from 52% in 1992 to 42% in 1997 to 35% in 2003. Ghana's income poverty gap is small compared with other developing countries.

Government has made **reasonable progress** against the education MDGs in the absence – until recently – of sustained and concerted policy engagement and funding from donors. Gross primary enrolment rose by 7% between 1999 and 2004 to over 86%, but these statistics discount the recent positive impacts of the capitation grants scheme. The primary completion rate rose by over 5% between 2003 and 2004 to around 78%.

Net Primary school enrolment (MDG 2) rose from 79.5% in 1999 to 92.1% in 2005 (Ghana Ministry of Education Stats). This rise has happened while maintaining broadly equal numbers of boys and girls (MDG 3). For every 100 boys there are 94 girls.

Source: DFID, 2006: 15; DFID, 2007; World Bank, 2007

However, there are still more than one million primary school-age children not enrolled at the primary level, and developments at the post-basic level (e.g. the post-basic elements of the 2004 White Paper) might threaten UPE. In the last few years, secondary and tertiary enrolments have increased dramatically and the recurrent cost implications could mean a reduction in support to basic education. The main challenge within the Ghanaian education sector remains the question of quality particularly at the primary level where very few children who do attend school become literate and learn.

A broader view of partnership is needed within the education sector, one which incorporates the full involvement of civil society as potential agents of change ensuring that they are recognised as supporters and transformative agents of the state sector helping to achieve the MDG and EFA goals. Several policy frameworks developed within Ghana's education sector has increased the complexity of relations between state and non state actors involved in the education sector; this complexity may hamper the ability of the state to fulfil district, national and international targets.

The new white paper reforms diverges remarkably from the existing educational policy framework, the ESP, and largely advocates an increased focus on the post-basic education and skills training levels. Hence, tensions exist over education and training priorities between donor agencies (who have their sights on international targets set by the MDGs) and government (which appears to want to focus more on post-basic education and training). This has the potential of creating problems for donor assistance, including donors potentially withholding financing for education and the problems

arising from the Multi-Donor Budget Support (MDBS) and the FTI mechanisms. For example, donors might be encouraged to add more ‘disbursement triggers’ (conditionalities) to budget assistance, or to question the effectiveness of Direct Budget Support (DBS). Given the fungibility of aid under the MDBS, the GoG would likely be able to pursue its own education objectives (e.g., expanding post-basic education) regardless of many DPs’ wishes for a focus on basic/primary education.

This literature review demonstrates that the closeness of the partnership between DPs and the GoG on the one hand, and the partnership amongst DPs on the other, has fluctuated since the mid-1980s. It was reasonably good during the mid-1980s to early 1990s as DPs were able to align support to the 1987 education reform, following the lead of the World Bank. During the mid-1990s to 2002 partnerships amongst DPs deteriorated and hence DP partnership with the GoG, while generally aligned to fCUBE, was uncoordinated. 2003 signalled the start of a better partnership with the GoG’s GPRS I and ESP documents providing a clear strategy that DPs could get behind, and closer partnership arrangements like the MDBS emerging.

This partnership, however, is not without its own problems, ranging from lack of coordination and agreement in key programme areas such as assessment approaches, reporting formats and quality improvement programmes to the reluctance of some donors to participate in some aid programmes in which they do not have a dominant voice or position. The review has also shown that despite substantial increases in donor resources for education reforms, system wide outcomes in the sector remain much lower than expected. The review also suggests a widening resource gap and inequities in financing between different sub sectors, populations and regions of the country. Both the rich and the poor, male and female, suffer from falling education outcomes in education. However, the impact of donor partnerships on the sector remains under researched along with the impact of poor educational standards on various grouping within the education sector.

Given this mixed record of aid and educational outcomes, there appears to be a need to study, and propose alternative methods for enhancing aid effectiveness particularly within specific sub-sectors such as primary and basic education in order to ensure that the MDGs are met. It also suggests that a broader definition of partnership be considered which fully encompasses non state civil society actors in the process of educational development and improvement programmes. Some of the research questions which need further investigation in Ghana are:

- What is the impact of the poor education outcomes on children from various poverty quintiles, across the regions of Ghana and across diverse socio economic contexts? Who has benefited and who has gained?
- What has been the responsibility of development partners, if any, in the failure to reform the basic education, gender equity and training sector?
- Can the people of Ghana hold the Government and DPs accountable for the failures?

- How have inequities within educational expenditure and outcomes been addressed and monitored?
- Given the fungibility of aid under the MDBS, to what extent can the GoG pursue its own education objectives (e.g., expanding post-basic education) regardless of many DPs' wishes for a focus on basic/primary education?
- What impact does the relationship between government (state) and civil society (non state) have on the education sector?
- How have changing aid modalities and partnership arrangements impacted on the educational outcomes of the poor?

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Annex 1: Government Initiatives and External Agency Support in Basic Education since the 1960s

Government initiatives related to Basic Education	External agency and development partner initiatives (focus on the main agencies: World Bank, DFID, USAID) in support of Basic Education ⁴⁰
<p>1960 Education Act (87) - making primary schooling compulsory and free with effect from September 1961 - although it does not define until what age the child should attend school. Established private institutions.</p> <p>Enrolment doubled in five years and Ghana gained recognition for having the most developed Education system in Africa.</p>	<p>Before the 1987 Education Reform Programme (see below), there was some support from external agencies and development partners to basic education; e.g. UNICEF (support to experimental junior secondary schools); the World Bank (who provided some support to social services, including education); and Japan through the Japanese Overseas Cooperation Volunteers (JOCV) since 1977 (however, about 60% of JOCV go to SSS and a further 20% to VTIs).</p>
<p>1966-81 Period of successive political coups</p> <p>Educational restructuring was conceived but not implemented.</p> <p>Declining quality due to economic decline and large number of trained teachers are lost to out-migration.</p>	<p>1983: IMF/World Bank Structural adjustment programme (SAP) adopted by Ghana.</p>
<p>1986: Project Management Unit (PMU), located in the MoE, set up to procure items for both World Bank EdSACs (see right). The PMU assumed responsibility for the management of all external projects at this time; e.g. the budget support component of USAID's PREP (see right) went through the PMU. The PMU (was later renamed 'Funding and Procurement Management Unit') was responsible for technical aspects of procurement and disbursements (for the World Bank, AfDB and KfW); other agencies (e.g. DFID from 1998, and USAID after PREP) managed their own funding.</p> <p>1987: Education Reform Programme initiated - total restructuring of Basic Education system.</p> <p>1992: Constitution – introduced Free Compulsory Universal Basic Education (fCUBE), set to be a constitutional obligation by 2005.</p> <p>1993: GoG embarked on fCUBE which began to be operationalised in 1996. FCUBE aimed at a sector wide, comprehensive change to improve teaching and learning outcomes, efficiency in management, and increased access and participation through enhanced community participation.</p> <p>1993: District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF)</p>	<p>1987: Education Reform Programme heavily funded by the World Bank (see below).</p> <p>1986-91: World Bank Health and Education Rehabilitation Project; education component was US\$ 6.1 million to primary school text books; US\$ 13.1 million support to stationary (exercise books, pens etc), though not all to the basic education level.</p> <p>1986-94: World Bank Education Structural Adjustment Credits (EdSAC) linked to the Education Reform Programme; EdSAC I (1986-91, US\$ 38.3 million), EdSAC II (1990-94, US\$ 53.2 million) – budget support with conditionalities for release of funding.</p> <p>1990: World Conference on Education for All, Jomtien, Thailand. Signals a shift in external agency support to prioritise basic, especially primary, education.</p> <p>1990-05: USAID Primary Education Programme (PREP) (US\$ 35 million) – 90% of funding was budget support. Focus on software (e.g. teacher training and national assessment), but about 30% of funding allocated to textbooks.</p> <p>1990 – ongoing: EU micro-projects programme (EU MPP); a district allocated fund with about 30% of all micro-project funding used for educational projects - mainly support for</p>

⁴⁰ These are not the only external agency and development partner initiatives concerned with basic education, but the main ones (others included in this table are JICA, UNICEF, EU). For example, there has also been assistance to the basic education sector over this period from a large number of NGOs.

<p>set up as a statutory budget item (paid for from 5% of central government revenue) of which 20% is recommended for education infrastructure.</p> <p>1994: Education Reform Review Committee set up to revise academic programmes under the reform programme at basic and secondary levels in order to enhance quality and performance.</p>	<p>school block construction (about US\$ 7.5 million used for educational projects, with about 1,500 school blocks constructed by 2004).</p> <p>1992-97: World Bank Literacy and Functional Skills Project (US\$ 27.8 million).</p> <p>1992-04: World Bank National Functional Literacy Programme (US\$ 23.7 million).</p> <p>1993-98: World Bank Primary School Development (PSD) Project – objective to increase learning achievements and enrolments in primary schools. About 85% of funds spent on educational infrastructure (e.g. classroom blocks, head teacher’s bungalow). The project was restructured at the mid-term review to better support the fCUBE (see below); but changes made little difference to the allocation of funds (with most still spent on hardware).</p> <p>1995 UNICEF Ghana: National Programme of Action for the Survival, Protection and Development of Children.</p>
<p>1996 (July): Free Compulsory Universal Basic Education (fCUBE) programme operationalised. Whole School Development (WSD) programme launched - the MoE/GES classroom-focussed basic-education strategy for achieving the fCUBE objectives. FCUBE secretariat set up in GES to coordinate (support to) the fCUBE programme.</p> <p>1997: GoG funding agency consultative panel established to improve GoG-agency collaboration. Met twice a year.</p> <p>1998: FCUBE secretariat largely disbanded due to lack of efficiency. Replaced by a Development Partners coordinator in March 1999.</p>	<p>1996: Mid-term Review of progress in EFA. Sector wide fCUBE programme launched.</p> <p>1996-02: World Bank Basic Education Sector Improvement Project (BESIP) (US\$ 47.9 million) – intended to support the government’s policy of fCUBE. Despite Bank acknowledgement that ‘more attention has to be paid to software’, most (c.77%) Bank resources for the project were devoted to hardware and instructional materials.</p> <p>1997-04: USAID Quality Improvements in Primary Schools (QUIPS) (US\$ 51.8 million) – 26% of funding was budget support; 74% was allocated to the improvement of 367 schools. Intended to support the GoG fCUBE programme.</p> <p>1998-05: DFID Education Sector Support Project (ESSP) (UK£50 million). Focus on basic education in support of fCUBE. Using a sub-sector budget support approach, ESSP funds were disbursed via the Ghana Education Service (GES) in support of the Whole School Development (WSD) programme and focused on district and school level interventions.</p> <p>DFID begins support to the sector with ESSP (1998 -above) but other donors continue financing through project driven mechanisms (e.g. USAID QUIPS in 1997).</p>
<p>1999: National Education Forum led to the creation of the Development Partner Co-ordination Unit of the MoEYS meant to co-ordinate the activities of all the Development Partners supporting the Education Sector.</p> <p>1999: Education Sector Strategic Plan (1999-2001)</p>	<p>2000: Millennium Development Goals – education goal of UPE maintains external agency prioritisation for basic, especially primary, education.</p> <p>2001: NPP government decided to apply for debt relief under the enhanced IMF–World Bank Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative</p>

<p>Education Sector Review supported by UNICEF, the World Bank and DfID.</p> <p>2000: Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP)</p> <p>2001: New Patriotic Party (NPP) wins election</p> <p>2001: GETFund set up (a statutory budget paid for from 2.5 percentage points of the 12.5% VAT) - but most (up to 90%) of funding goes to tertiary education.</p> <p>2002: Presidential Committee of Review of Education Reforms.</p> <p>2003: Education Strategic Plan (2003-15) provides a sector-wide approach (SWAp) framework for all donors to support the sector. The ESP provides a clear policy framework and indicative practical measures designed to achieve the six EFA Dakar goals and the two education MDGs. The ESP prioritises the basic education service delivery components of the GPRS.</p> <p>2003-2005: Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS I).</p> <p>2004: Ghana joins the EFA Fast Track Initiative</p> <p>2004: White Paper on the Report of the Education Reform Committee. Proposes to expand basic education to 11 years (2 years KG, 6 primary, 3 JSS); reform JSS etc.</p> <p>2004: Education Sector Technical Advisory Committee (ESTAC) set up by the education ministry to oversee the ESP process and coordinate development partner assistance.</p> <p>2006-2009: Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS II).</p>	<p>2000-2005: Japan (JICA) Science, Technology and Mathematics in Basic Education (STM) project - to support fCUBE mainly in teacher training (US \$6.49 million).</p> <p>2000-02: Japan grants for school block construction (US\$ 0.5 million) – project funded 80 classroom blocks.</p> <p>Since 2003: Multi Donor Budgetary Support (MDBS); Denmark, Germany, Holland, UK, Canada, Switzerland and France (since 2005), alongside the World Bank, the IMF, the AfDB and the EU providing some of their assistance as direct budgetary support (in the form of Poverty Reduction Budget Support) to finance Government (GPRS) priorities, including in education. Multi-Donor Budget Support (MDBS) is designed to support the speedy implementation of the GPRS, particularly in the three relatively disadvantaged regions in the north of the country.</p> <p>2003: DFID technical assistance personnel involved in the design and preparation of the ESP.</p> <p>2004-2009: World Bank Education Sector Project (EdSeP). Includes a component to build capacity at all levels of the educational system between and within organizations in the sector; improve the quality of leadership and management in the sector; another component is a pilot programme scheme which applies to basic education.</p> <p>2004: USAID Education Quality for All – EQUALL Project.</p> <p>2006: Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) – some support to construction and rehabilitation of educational facilities, especially at the KG and primary levels.</p> <p>2006-2009: DFID Support to Education Strategic Plan (SESP). Focus on basic education. The goal of SESP is the achievement of the MDGs relating to education. The SESP forms part of DFID's long term commitment to provide UK£10m to educational development in Ghana each year until 2015, subject to satisfactory performance on agreed sector outputs and Millennium Development Goals targets. 80% of total DFID support now through the MDBS mechanism through DFID's Poverty Reduction Budget Support (PRBS).</p> <p>2007: Ghana Joint Assistance Strategy (G-JAS) aligns majority of donors with GPRS II priorities, including in education.</p>
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Source: authors and Buchert, 2002; Casely-Hayford, 2000; Palmer, 2005c; World Bank, 2004a

Annex 2: Government Initiatives and External Agency Support to Skills Development

Government initiatives related to Skills Development	External agency and development partner initiatives in support of Skills Development ⁴¹
<p>1957 White Paper on a National Workers Brigade</p> <p>1960 Education Act (87) - making primary schooling compulsory and free with effect from September 1961 - although it does not define until what age the child should attend school. Established private institutions (many of which offer TVET).</p> <p>1966 Kwapong Educational Review Committee – introduced continuation schools</p> <p>1970 The National Vocational Training Institute (NVTI) Act (351) - responsible for the nationwide coordination of all aspects of vocational training including apprenticeship - in both formal and informal sectors.</p> <p>1972 Dzobo Educational Reform Committee – experimental pre-vocational courses at the junior secondary level.</p> <p>1981 National Board for Small-Scale Industries (NBSSI) Act (434) – set up to promote and develop the small-scale industrial sector. NBSSI contains a training element.</p> <p>1986 Evans Anfom Committee – re-introduced the pre-vocational classes at the junior secondary level.</p> <p>1986 Integrated Community Centres for Employable Skills (ICCES) established with UNICEF support. Initially 12 pilot centres, the ICCES network expanded to 59 by 2007.</p> <p>1987 Ghana Regional Appropriate Technology Industrial Service (GRATIS) - set up by the Government to promote small-scale industrialisation and provide employment opportunities, improve incomes and enhance the development of Ghana. GRATIS provides training and technical assistance to artisans through ten Intermediate Technology Transfer Units. GRATIS experiences a high rate of labour turnover in the project as a result of low remuneration and motivation for the workers. There is high level of worker dissatisfaction with poor conditions of employment.</p>	<p>1960s Soviet Union support to technical institutes during the 1960s. When Nkrumah was overthrown in 1966, Soviet technicians were expelled and USSR-supplied equipment and curricula in Ghana's public TVET sector was not maintained or upgraded.</p> <p>1960s onwards CIDA support to technical training institutes - to develop a secondary focus on providing short skills-upgrading courses for those already working in SMEs</p> <p>1977-2005 German support to technical institutes (e.g. Takoradi Technical Institute and Biriwa NVTI); also supported training of instructors in Germany and provided vehicles and other logistical support to NVTIs.</p> <p>1987 UNICEF - support to establishing 12 pilot ICCES centres (1987-92).</p> <p>1987 NGO and other small-scale ad hoc support to ICCES, 1987-2007 (e.g. NGOs providing volunteers; NGO support for micro-projects like classroom construction). Also some development partner embassy support to micro-projects like classroom or workshop construction (e.g. Japan's Grant Assistance for Grassroots Projects).</p>

⁴¹ These are not the only external agency and development partner initiatives concerned with skills development, but the main ones. For example, there has also been assistance to the skills development sector over this period from: a large number of NGOs (e.g. the Catholic Don Bosco support to 2 VTIs); from development partner embassy support to skills projects; and from foreign volunteers (e.g. VSO, JOCV) assigned to VTIs.

1990s	Informal sector associations supported by Rawlings' Provisional National Defence Council. Ostensibly to act as intermediaries between member enterprises and the government or other supporting bodies, though the establishment of many well-known ISAs had more to do with politics than self-help. ISAs often involved with monitoring training activities and providing certification to members.	
1990	National Coordinating Committee on Technical and Vocational Education and Training (NACVET) was set up to coordinate a national skills development system.	
1993:	District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF) set up as a statutory budget item (paid for from 5% of central government revenue) of which 20% is recommended for education infrastructure; a further 20% is allocated to a poverty alleviation fund which can be used to fund skills development initiatives in the district (e.g. in the case of many Assemblies in Ashanti Region funding infrastructure for ICCES)	
1995	National development agenda-Vision 2020 - outlines training policy objectives in terms of strengthening and expanding training facilities through; i) improving and expanding the infrastructure for training; ii) increasing opportunities for technical and vocational level training, and iii) strengthening linkages between the training sector and industry.	1995 Vocational Skills and Informal Sector support project (VSP) (World Bank funded – US\$ 5.8 million, 1995-2001) - focused on skills upgrading for 10,000 master-craftsmen and 15,000 traditional apprentices. The VSP did have some success in improving the outcomes of graduates, but experienced a number of problems and did not lead to any significant impact on the wider informal sector.
1998	Children's Act (560). Part V, sub-part II on apprenticeship in the informal sector – specifies minimum age of traditional apprenticeship should be 15 years or after completion of basic education (basic education being officially compulsory) (section 98). Sets out masters' responsibilities towards their apprentices regarding training (section 99), the apprenticeship agreement (section 100) duties (section 101) and release (section 102) of apprentice.	1995 Rural Enterprise Project (REP) (IFAD funded 1995 - ongoing) - aims to increase rural production, employment and income in order to alleviate poverty through the increased output of small off-farm enterprises. This is being accomplished by: facilitating access to new technology and business advice; promoting easier access to financial services; improving the efficiency of existing small rural enterprises, supporting the creation of new enterprises, and removing communication constraints through feeder road rehabilitation.
		1996 DFID NVTI Centres Support Project (1996-98) - to improve capacity of NVTIs to deliver quality training. Also supplied vehicles and equipment.
		1999 JICA US\$ 2.7 million study on the 'Development of Technical Education Plan for Ghana' (1999-2001) to develop a 'Master Plan to Strengthen Technical Education' (the basic concept of this master plan was adopted in the 2003 ESP – see below).
		1999 Netherlands - support to 20 VOTEC Resource Centres in some TVET institutions (1999-03)
2001	New Patriotic Party takes office; renewed	2000 CIDA support to GRATIS (2000-09)

<p>emphasis on skills development begins.</p> <p>2001 GoG undertakes unemployment registration exercise (Sept – Dec); exercise revealed demand for skills development.</p> <p>2002 Presidential Committee of Review of Education Reforms; comments that the skills development sector has been the object of ‘almost total neglect’.</p> <p>2002 GoG incorporates the salaries of most ICCES instructors into the national budget, removing responsibility from the communities and centres for staff remuneration.</p> <p>2003 Education Strategic Plan (ESP) (2003-15). One of the four main focus points of the ESP includes TVET (‘Science, Technology and TVET’).</p> <p>2003 Skills Training and Entrepreneurship Programme (STEP) launched, financed by the HIPC fund (US\$1.1 million was allocated to in 2003 to implement STEP); phase 1 (February–July 2003), phase 2 (November 2003–2005).</p> <p>2003 Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS I) (2003-05); short section on ‘Skills and entrepreneurial development for the youth’.</p> <p>2004 White Paper on the Report of the Education Reform Committee. Regarding skills, it acknowledges the failure of the JSS vocationalisation policy; proposes a diversification of the senior secondary level; promotes a more formalised apprenticeship training programmes with government assuming ‘full responsibility’ for the first year of the programme.</p> <p>2004 TVET Policy Framework Document; the first comprehensive national TVET policy. Proposes to dramatically expand the formal TVET sector and to include the informal system as part of public provision. Calls for the establishment of a Council for TVET (COTVET).</p> <p>2006 Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS II) (2006-09); section on ‘Training and Skills Development’ which sets out a series of priority areas: (i) provide skills and entrepreneurial training in a gender responsive and equitable manner; (ii) promote dialogue between industry and skills/professional training institutions to produce skilled labour required by industry; (iii) strengthen and support human resource training institutions; (iv) promote apprenticeship training; (v) promote the adoption of the National Youth Policy and enactment of the Disability Bill.</p> <p>2006 COTVET established (July) to coordinate and oversee all aspects of TVET, across ministries and the broad spectrum of formal, informal and non-formal education and training.</p>	<p>2001 Ghana becomes a HIPC member (April) and receives partial debt forgiveness; money saved by the government on debt servicing has gone into social and economic development projects around the country, including in skills development (e.g. the STEP in 2003 – see below).</p> <p>2001 JICA support to development of TVET policy framework and implementation of the competency based training approach (2001 – ongoing).</p> <p>2003-06 DP funding to TVET under the MoESS was only 0.2% in 2003, 2.3% in 2004, 0.9% in 2005 and 1% in 2006.</p> <p>2004 ILO–IPEC Multi-bilateral Programme of Technical Cooperation on skills training strategies to combat child labour in the urban informal sector (funded through the government of Canada, 2004 – ongoing); reforming traditional apprenticeship is part of the strategy of this project.</p> <p>2005 Announcement that Ghana’s multilateral debt was to be written off by the International Community.</p> <p>2005 EU support to a small vocational training programme in the north.</p> <p>2005 CIDA support to the ‘Toolkit for Change’ project (2005-10).</p> <p>2005 JICA Technical Vocational Education and Training Support (TVETS) Project (2005-2009); a pilot project on competency based training.</p> <p>2006 Netherlands support to the new Ghana Industrial Skills Development Centre at Tema (a public – private partnership).</p>
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Source: Palmer, 2007a

Annex 3: Ghana Partnership Strategy Results Matrix for Education and Skills Development (GoG/DP, 2006: 8-10)

GPRS Goals	Expected Outcomes	Indicators to Track Implementation towards Outcomes	Government Strategies and Actions	Development Partner Contributions
EDUCATION				
Access	<p>Enrolment, survival and completion rates increased in kindergarten, primary, JSS, SSS and TVET</p> <p>Rates:</p> <p><u>GER</u> 2006 - 2009</p> <p>KG 64.5% - 76.3%</p> <p>Primary 90.3% - 99%</p> <p>JSS 76.3% - 86.6%</p> <p>SSS 28.3% - 30.9%</p> <p>TVET 20,694 - 22,764</p> <p><u>Survival</u> 2006 - 2009</p> <p>KG 100%</p> <p>Primary 84.4% - 92.6%</p> <p>JSS 88% - 92%</p> <p>Completion 2006 - 2009</p> <p>Primary 6 81.9%</p> <p>JSS 3 77.9%</p>	<p>Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER) in Primary, Jr. Secondary School (JSS), Sr. Secondary School (SSS), Net Enrolment Ratio (NER) and Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET)</p> <p>Survival rate: P6; JSS 3; SSS3</p> <p>Passage of Education Bill and TVET Bill</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Expand preschool access in all basic schools to ensure smooth transition from home to school Increase school enrolment Accelerate the rehabilitation /development of basic school infrastructure (with water and toilet facilities) Remove barriers to primary school entry and retention Shift burden of payments for education services away from poorer students at lower levels (especially the girl-child) Ensure that buildings and other physical infrastructure in schools and training institutions are made accessible to the physically disabled Adopt targeted programmes to improve access in underserved areas Expand Non Formal Education in partnership with community groups, NGOs and private providers Facilitate the implementation of capitation grants in all public primary schools Enact laws that support implementation of FCUBE Ensure relevance and coverage of vocational and technical training Diversify vocational and technical training to link with industry Support private-public partnership in the management of vocational and technical schools 	<p>MDBS/PRSC</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> To increase access, completion and quality in basic education, support for extending capitation grants to all pupils attending public primary and junior secondary schools and for increasing GPER in the three most deprived regions. Bridge gender gap in access. Reducing teacher vacancies in deprived districts; help expand teacher retention schemes and implement District sponsorship scheme for teacher trainees based on teacher needs assessment To improve efficiency and equity of financing education with attention to greater poverty impact, continue to help deliver increased resources to 53 deprived districts <p>ONGOING FINANCING</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Development Partners provide coordinated support for all six goals in the education sector, either through specific projects (AfDB, BADEA, France, Germany GTZ, JICA, UNESCO, UNICEF, USAID, WFP, IFC) or sector programmes (DfID, EC, Netherlands, World Bank) or

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promote entrepreneurship among the youth • Enhance Infrastructural development in universities and polytechnics • Develop a national policy on Distance Education 	general budget support (MDBS group)
GPRS Goals	Expected Outcomes	Indicators to Track Implementation towards Outcomes	Government Strategies and Actions	Development Partner Contributions
Gender	Gender parity in school enrolment GPI <u>National 2006 - 2009</u> <i>KG</i> 1.0 <i>Primary</i> 1.0 <i>JSS</i> 0.93 - 1.0 <u>Deprived District 2006 - 2009</u> <i>KG</i> 1.0 <i>Primary</i> 1.0 <i>JSS</i> 0.93 - 1.0 Participation 2006 - 2009 <i>SSS</i> 44.1% - 46% <i>TVET</i> 18.3% - 31.4%	GPI: National, Deprived Districts at KG, Primary, JSS, SSS, TVET	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide incentive schemes to increase girls enrolment, retention and completion particularly in deprived areas • Sensitize parents and communities about the importance of girls' education • Implement School Feeding programme • Implement Girls Scholarship Schemes 	
Quality	Improved quality of education National Education Assessment Text Score 2006 - 2009 64.6% - 66.4% % of Trained Teachers National 2006 - 2009 <i>KG</i> 37.4% - 61.5% <i>Primary</i> 75.5% - 85% <i>JSS</i> 85.2% - 90.4% Deprived District	Proportion of students passing National Assessment Exams (BECE; SSCE) with good grades Percentage of trained teachers in basic schools: National, Deprived Districts, Primary, JSS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Introduce programme of national education quality assessment • Ensure teacher development, deployment and supervision • Provide incentives to teachers in deprived areas • Improve the teaching of Science, technology and mathematics in all basic schools • Develop and promote the use of ICT in all schools and institutions of higher learning 	

	<p>2006 - 2009</p> <p>KG 24.9% - 58.4%</p> <p>Primary 60.2% - 81.1%</p> <p>JSS 81.5% - 89.5%</p>			
GPRS Goals	Expected Outcomes	Indicators to Track Implementation towards Outcomes	Government Strategies and Actions	Development Partner Contributions
Education management	Improved systems and efficiency in education service delivery	% of GoG non salary recurrent expenditure National and Deprived Districts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthen and improve educational planning and management • Stress and support private sector participation in education • Strengthen institutional arrangement for the role of CBO, CSO in advocacy, monitoring and evaluation • Strengthen monitoring and evaluation framework and reporting channels as a key priority • Construction and rehabilitation of basic school classrooms 	
Science, Mathematics and Technical Education	Enhance teaching and learning of Science and Mathematics	<p>Scores in Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMS)</p> <p>No. of Students reading science, mathematics and technical programmes at the second cycle and tertiary levels</p> <p>No. of TVET institutions</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide incentive schemes to attract more teachers into the teaching of science and technical education • Support science and research institutions • Provide incentives to attract science students • Increase funding for research and technology development • Support private sector initiatives in science education • 15 existing Teacher Training Colleges converted to specialise in the teaching of Mathematics and Science by 2009 • Provide incentives and support to private technical and vocational institutions 	
Behavioral Health	Issues of population, gender, health, HIV/AIDS, fire safety, road safety, civic responsibility and environment mainstreamed in the curricula of schools and institutions of higher	Report on curricula	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promote the study of and integrate in the curricula of schools and institutions of higher learning attitudinal change regarding population, good health, gender, fire safety, road safety, civic responsibility and environment concerns • Identify and promote programmes that will assist in the prevention and management of HIV/AIDS 	

	learning			
GPRS Goals	Expected Outcomes	Indicators to Track Implementation towards Outcomes	Government Strategies and Actions	Development Partner Contributions
SKILLS AND MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT				
	Comprehensive HRD policy and planning framework	HRD policy and planning framework document Functional HRD Unit	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop a comprehensive manpower development policy framework that takes into account specific needs of men and women, persons living with disability, HIV/AIDS, public and private sector at all levels • Establish a National HR Unit 	
	Improved training, deployment and retention of key HR	Unemployment Rate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop HRD Plan at all levels • Provide adequate incentives to retain skilled labour • Provide adequate resources for human resource capacity development 	
	Improved match between labour market needs and skills available	Regular reports on Labour Market Information System	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Undertake Human Resource capacity survey 	Labour Market Information System -- German Trust Fund (WB)
	Increased levels of productivity	Proportion of unemployed youth benefiting from skills/apprenticeship and entrepreneurial training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Train unemployed youth in competency based demand driven skills, including the Youth Mass Employment Programme • Promote and establish production units in vocational training centres • Set standards for vocational training and entrepreneurial development • Intensify co-operative education and its practice in collaboration with stakeholders • Promote the training of people with disability • Implement National Apprenticeship Programme 	PLANNED FINANCING <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • e-Ghana – WB ANALYTICAL AND OTHER SUPPORT <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Youth & Employment Study – WB • Pilot Competency Based Training Project (JICA)
	Improved collaboration between industries	No. of people receiving on the job training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establish collaboration between human resource capacity development institutions and industry 	
	Improved quality of training	Level of employer satisfaction with quality of trainees	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assist HR training institutions to develop new syllabi/curricula to meet requirements of industry 	

Annex 4: DP Harmonisation and selectivity in support of education and skills development objectives in the GPRS II

GPRS II Pillar/Objective	2006 Financing	Planned Financing 2007- 2010	Country Analytic/ Advisory work	More harmonized working	Greater selectivity
Pillar 2: Human Development					
Obj 1: Education	Coordinated DP support through (i) specific projects - AfDB, BADEA, France, Spain, Germany, IFC, Japan, WFP, UNESCO, UNICEF, USAID (ii) sector programmes - DFID, EC, WB, EFA/FTI	Coordinated DP support through (i) specific projects - USAID, Japan UNESCO, MCA, AfDB, UNICEF, France (ii) sector programmes - WB, DFID, RNE (silent with DFID), EFA/FTI	WB, DFID, Japan, WFP, UNICEF, UNESCO Joint GoG/DP work planned for 2007.	DPs providing coordinated support to Education Sector Strategy through active working group. DPs supporting sector programmes using government systems for channelling funds.	EC & RNE to delegate advisory role to DFID. EC to move funds to MDBS. DFID to manage RNE funds to the sector.
Obj 2: Skills development	WB, Japan	WB, Japan	WB		

Source: G-JAS, 2007: 42-43

Annex 5: Donor support for education, 1987-2002, in millions of US\$

	Total	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
HERP	3.47	0.62	0.68	0.93	0.62	0.62											
EdSAC I	38.32	9.36	3.16	4.67	9.90	10.21	1.02										
EdSAC II	53.20					13.30	10.60	8.70	4.60	16.00							
CSSC	15.18						5.41	4.31	3.26	2.20							
Literacy and functional skills	10.63						0.00	2.02	1.39	2.51	2.64	2.07					
Tertiary education project	44.80							3.20	0.60	8.20	12.20	15.40	4.20	1.00			
PSD	53.20								2.50	9.20	20.30	15.20	5.90	0.10			
Vocational Skills	5.80										0.80	0.80	0.40	1.50	1.30	1.00	
BESIP												1.28	2.57	1.28	17.30	12.37	10.70
National functional literacy																1.00	4.00
Total World Bank	271.7	9.4	3.2	4.7	9.9	23.5	17.0	18.2	12.4	38.1	35.9	34.7	13.1	3.9	18.6	14.4	14.7
Total Bilateral (DAC)	317.3	1.2	0.9	6.9	12.3	18.6	19.2	5.0	3.3	13.4	24.4	56.2	104.4	37.3	14.2	n.a	n.a
Total Donor	589	10.6	4.1	11.6	22.2	42.1	36.2	23.2	15.7	51.5	60.3	90.9	117.5	41.2	32.8	14.4	14.7
Bank share of total (%)	46.1	88.7	78.0	40.5	44.6	55.8	47.0	78.4	79.0	74.0	59.5	38.2	11.1	9.5	56.7	100.0	100.0
Non-Bank share of total (%)	53.9	11.3	22.0	59.5	55.4	44.2	53.0	21.6	21.0	26.0	40.5	61.8	88.9	90.5	43.3		
Source: <i>World Bank 2004.</i>		11.32	21.95	59.48	55.41	44.18	53.04	21.55	21.02	26.02	40.46	61.83	88.85	90.53	43.29		